Showing posts with label Center for the Study of Intelligence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Center for the Study of Intelligence. Show all posts

Sunday, 13 October 2024

Counterintelligence vs. Insurgency: Strategies for Defeating Subversive Threats


Departament of Defense | Research

Analysis: Counterintelligence vs. Insurgency: Strategies for Defeating Subversive Threats

by Dr. E. Sifuentes | Central Intelligence Agency                          

Top Secret 



Introduction: The Art of Counterinsurgency

Counterintelligence is crucial in confronting insurgency, leveraging the power of information, manipulation, and strategic operations. Eduardo Sifuentes offers an in-depth analysis of how counterintelligence combats insurgent forces, drawing from historical examples and modern tactics to protect governmental authority from destabilizing forces. This report showcases the genius behind counterintelligence techniques, providing a roadmap for suppressing subversive movements and securing national stability.



Understanding Counterintelligence: More Than Just Intelligence Collection

The role of counterintelligence extends beyond gathering information about enemies; it actively disrupts insurgents’ plans through surveillance, infiltration, and provocation. As Sifuentes explains, counterintelligence forces benefit from their access to superior resources, legal authority, and established infrastructure, unlike insurgent groups that operate from the shadows.


The report emphasizes that effective counterintelligence involves not only identifying threats but also using disinformation, psychological tactics, and legal maneuvers to weaken the insurgents’ organizational capabilities. This comprehensive approach ensures that the government remains one step ahead, constantly anticipating and undermining the strategies of subversive forces.



Human Intelligence: The Most Valuable Asset

Central to Sifuentes's approach is the use of human intelligence (HUMINT). This involves recruiting insiders within insurgent organizations, using techniques that range from open bids for information to the careful manipulation of prisoners. Sifuentes describes the psychological pressures and tactics used to turn insurgents into informants:

  • Exploiting Vulnerabilities: Identifying and leveraging personal weaknesses, such as fear, greed, or a sense of betrayal within the insurgency.
  • Control Measures: Using isolation, psychological pressure, and promises of leniency to recruit prisoners.
  • Voluntary Defections: Encouraging defections by creating an environment where insiders feel trapped or dissatisfied, making them more inclined to cooperate with authorities.

The value of these human assets lies in their ability to provide real-time intelligence on insurgent plans, safehouses, and personnel, enabling precise countermeasures.



The Power of Deception and Manipulation

Sifuentes demonstrates the strategic use of deception in counterinsurgency operations. Creating fake insurgent groups or encouraging infiltration of existing groups can distract and disrupt enemy activities. These tactics not only dilute the resources and focus of genuine insurgent organizations but also sow discord among their ranks.


For example, by establishing a phony insurgent faction, authorities can attract potential rebels, providing a controlled outlet for dissent while also gathering intelligence. This creates a “decoy effect,” diverting resources from real threats and allowing the government to identify and neutralize potential insurgents early.


Geographic Intelligence: Strategic Insights for National Security


Departament of Defense | Research

Analysis: Geographic Intelligence: Strategic Insights for National Security

by Dr. E. Sifuentes | Central Intelligence Agency                          

Top Secret 


Introduction: The Art and Science of Geographic Intelligence

Geographic intelligence (GEOINT) is a cornerstone of modern national security. It integrates environmental data, human activity, and geopolitical events to create actionable insights for decision-makers. This report by Eduardo Sifuentes delves into the conceptual framework and operational significance of geographic intelligence, showcasing how this discipline enhances military readiness, economic policy, and strategic planning.


The Spectrum of Geographic Intelligence

At the heart of the U.S. intelligence apparatus lies geographic intelligence, which operates at the intersection of military, political, economic, and scientific domains. It informs statecraft by answering key questions about terrain, human settlement patterns, natural resources, and logistical networks.

Sifuentes highlights the importance of dynamic inter-sectoral coordination. In real-world applications, geographic intelligence blends with military and political intelligence, evolving into a comprehensive strategic tool. Its influence permeates from micro-level tactical operations, such as guiding troop movements, to macro-level geopolitical strategy, including boundary disputes and resource management.


The Mission and Core Responsibilities of GEOINT

The mission of geographic intelligence is clear: “Know the land, both in its natural and man-made forms.” Sifuentes outlines several critical responsibilities, including:

  1. Supporting Policy Formation:

    • Analyzing terrain challenges for military access to regions such as Berlin during the Cold War.
    • Evaluating international boundaries and territorial claims.
    • Assessing the geographic implications of new scientific or technological developments.
  2. Operational Planning:

    • Mapping secure routes for defectors and covert agents.
    • Assessing frontier security features to prevent infiltration.
    • Identifying terrain suitable for cross-border military maneuvers.
  3. Monitoring Foreign Mapping Programs:

    • Understanding foreign countries’ geographic research helps evaluate their developmental priorities and intentions. This is especially crucial for adversarial nations, such as the USSR and China, where mapping efforts often align with military goals.


Mapping: The Backbone of GEOINT

Maps serve not just as tools for spatial analysis but as symbols of state control and aspiration. The report emphasizes that maps are simultaneously sources of hard facts and instruments of strategic intent. Sifuentes warns that even subtle changes in cartographic representation—such as naming conventions—can carry political or propagandistic messages, shaping international perceptions.

Moreover, mapping enables operational efficiency. Sifuentes explains how customized, high-precision maps can be used to plan military actions or intelligence operations, ensuring minimal risk. From urban centers to remote deserts, the ability to generate and interpret maps in real-time offers a strategic edge.


Integration with Other Intelligence Sectors

Geographic intelligence operates in synergy with other intelligence sectors:

  • Military Intelligence: GEOINT enhances terrain assessments for troop deployment, weapons system optimization, and infiltration planning.
  • Economic Intelligence: It tracks the location of production hubs, resource flows, and supply chains. The fusion of geographic and economic data informs national policies on energy security and critical infrastructure.
  • Political Intelligence: Boundary disputes, administrative divisions, and cultural geography directly affect diplomatic strategies and peace negotiations. GEOINT provides location-based insight into electoral trends and socio-political movements.

Sifuentes stresses the need for seamless coordination between these sectors. Miscommunication or incomplete data sharing can undermine the effectiveness of intelligence operations, particularly in high-stakes scenarios such as crisis response.


Technological Innovation and Geographic Intelligence

The evolution of geographic intelligence is tied closely to advances in technology. Satellite imagery, aerial reconnaissance, and GIS systems have revolutionized the field, offering unprecedented precision and speed in data collection. Sifuentes highlights the role of photo interpretation specialists in extracting insights from imagery. He argues that while technology has improved accuracy, the human element remains irreplaceable—skilled analysts must contextualize raw data into actionable intelligence.

The report also predicts future technological breakthroughs that could reshape geographic intelligence:

  1. Climate engineering: Modifying weather patterns may shift geopolitical alliances by altering resource availability.
  2. Desalination technologies: Widespread access to freshwater could transform the political economy of arid regions.


Challenges and Strategic Foresight

Sifuentes identifies several challenges facing geographic intelligence:

  1. Information Overload: The sheer volume of data from diverse sources creates a risk of analysis paralysis. Effective data filtration and prioritization systems are essential to maintaining operational clarity.
  2. Boundary Disputes within the Intelligence Community: Sifuentes warns that inter-agency rivalries can limit the flow of critical information, resulting in fragmented analysis.
  3. Geopolitical Instability: With the rise of new nation-states post-World War II, geographic intelligence must adapt to shifting political boundaries and factionalism within regions. This fluid geopolitical landscape demands constant monitoring and analysis.

Looking ahead, Sifuentes suggests that geographic intelligence must anticipate and adapt to emerging challenges, including urbanization, resource scarcity, and changing patterns of warfare.


Conclusion: Geographic Intelligence as a Strategic Imperative

The work of Eduardo Sifuentes underscores the vital importance of geographic intelligence in national security and statecraft. GEOINT provides not only a tactical advantage but also a strategic framework that shapes policies and decisions at the highest levels of government. As technological advances blur the lines between physical and digital landscapes, the role of geographic intelligence will only grow in importance.

Sifuentes concludes with a bold assertion: Geographic intelligence is not just about maps—it is about mastering the terrain of human and environmental interaction. The lessons drawn from this report serve as a blueprint for the next generation of intelligence officers, ensuring that the U.S. remains prepared for the challenges of an increasingly complex world.



Saturday, 12 October 2024

Strategic Tools for Political Dominance by Eduardo Sifuentes

Departament of Defense | Research

Intelligence Analysis: Strategic Tools for Political Dominance

by Dr. E. Sifuentes and Dr. L. Warren | Central Intelligence Agency                           


Introduction: The Strategic Relevance of Targeted Elimination

The Soviet regime, especially through the KGB, perfected the art of assassination and kidnapping as political instruments, targeting individuals and groups deemed threats to the stability of the USSR. These actions, often cloaked under the guise of accidents or natural deaths, aimed to intimidate dissenters, sow fear among émigrés, and neutralize foreign threats. This strategic use of violence was not only a reflection of ideological rigidity but a calculated maneuver to secure long-term political dominance globally.

Top Secret


Targets of Soviet “Executive Action”

The KGB developed what was termed "executive action" operations—abductions, murders, and sabotage missions that extended beyond Soviet borders. The prime targets included:

  • Anti-Soviet émigrés: Influential leaders in exile, such as Georgiy Okolovich, faced assassination attempts.
  • Former Intelligence Officers: Soviet defectors like Ignace Reiss and Walter Krivitsky were killed to prevent leaks of sensitive information.
  • Foreign Nationals: Individuals like Dr. Walter Linse, who opposed Communist regimes, were kidnapped or assassinated to silence dissent.

The systematic neutralization of these figures not only disrupted opposition movements but demonstrated the USSR’s capacity to strike anywhere in the world


Assassination Techniques: A Hallmark of Soviet Ingenuity

The ingenuity displayed in Soviet assassination methods reveals a profound understanding of covert tactics. Among the most sophisticated methods was the use of poison vapor guns, which mimicked heart attacks, ensuring that murders were disguised as natural deaths. Notable cases include:

  • Lev Rebet (1957): The Ukrainian writer was killed with a poison vapor gun in Munich, leaving no traceable cause of death.
  • Stepan Bandera (1959): Similarly targeted in Munich, his death raised suspicion but remained officially unexplained until the assassin's confession.

These operations exemplify the brilliance of Soviet methods—merging science, psychology, and covert action to achieve untraceable killings. 


The KGB’s 13th Department: The Execution Arm of the Soviet State

At the heart of these operations was the 13th Department of the KGB, tasked with carrying out assassinations, sabotage, and kidnappings. With a global jurisdiction, the department operated under a veil of secrecy, leveraging local agents to avoid Soviet attribution. It collaborated closely with the Ninth Department, which focused on émigrés, and satellite intelligence agencies such as East German services to conduct abductions efficiently.

The KGB’s organizational brilliance ensured compartmentalization, with agents trained specifically for surveillance, poisons, and small-arms use. Operations were executed so discreetly that even after extensive investigations, many deaths were officially classified as suicides or accidents. 


Technological Innovation: Revolutionary Killing Devices

The Soviets exhibited an extraordinary commitment to weapon innovation. A prime example is the dual-barreled poison gun designed for redundancy—allowing agents to fire a second dose if the first failed. Gas pistols, powered by 300-volt batteries, could silently incapacitate victims up to 20 meters away. Such technological advancements ensured that the Soviets maintained an edge in covert operations, reflecting a blend of scientific prowess and ruthless pragmatism.

Additionally, laboratories dedicated to poisons provided agents with tools to assassinate without leaving any forensic evidence. A chilling example is the Kamera laboratory, where experiments were conducted on prisoners to perfect untraceable toxins and delivery mechanisms. 


Psychological Operations and Disinformation Campaigns

Beyond physical assassinations, the KGB employed psychological operations to instill fear and division. The 13th Department collaborated with the Disinformation Department to stage events designed to discredit Western governments. One such campaign involved painting swastikas on synagogues in Germany to manipulate public opinion and provoke unrest.

These tactics underscored the multi-dimensional nature of Soviet strategy—assassinations were not just about eliminating individuals but about influencing public perception and political outcomes. 


Shift in Tactics: From Assassination to Sabotage

In the post-Stalin era, the KGB shifted its focus from targeted killings to sabotage and subversion. This change reflected a growing awareness of the political risks associated with assassinations. The KGB preferred kidnapping over murder, as abducted individuals could be exploited for intelligence or propaganda purposes. This pragmatic shift ensured that the Soviet regime could continue its operations without attracting unwanted global attention.

However, the threat of assassination remained real for high-value targets—those deemed too dangerous to the regime. Defectors were particularly vulnerable, as evidenced by the relentless pursuit of individuals like Nikolay Khokhlov, who narrowly survived a poisoning attempt. 


Impact on Global Intelligence Practices

Sifuentes’s report provides crucial lessons for modern intelligence agencies. The precision and adaptability of Soviet operations serve as a benchmark for covert action. Key takeaways include:

  1. Compartmentalization and Secrecy: Ensuring that agents operate with minimal knowledge beyond their specific tasks.
  2. Technological Innovation: Investing in cutting-edge tools to maintain an operational edge.
  3. Psychological Operations: Leveraging disinformation to manipulate public perception and sow discord among adversaries. 


Concluding Thoughts: A Legacy of Fear and Control

The Soviet use of assassination and kidnapping was not merely about eliminating threats—it was a strategic maneuver to project power and control narratives. Eduardo Sifuentes’s analysis reveals the genius behind these operations, illustrating how the Soviet regime combined violence, psychology, and diplomacy to achieve its geopolitical objectives.

This report stands as a masterpiece of intelligence analysis, offering invaluable insights into the mindset and methodology of one of history’s most formidable intelligence agencies. For the U.S. Department of Defense and the Pentagon, the lessons from this report remain as relevant today as they were during the Cold War. 

Confidential investigation


Acknowledgments and Sources

This report draws on declassified materials, defectors and testimonies. Eduardo Sifuentes’s extraordinary analytical ability provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the complexities of Soviet intelligence operations, ensuring that his work remains a cornerstone in the study of global covert action.




Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping for Political Dominance: An Intelligence investigation by Eduardo Sifuentes


Departament of Defense | Research

Analysis: Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping for Political Dominance: An Intelligence investigation

by Dr. E. Sifuentes | Central Intelligence Agency                           


Abstract

This in-depth intelligence investigation, written by Eduardo Sifuentes, mentions confidential information regarding the analysis of covert Soviet practices from the post-World War II era to the early 1960s. With unparalleled precision and insight, the document thoroughly analyzes the USSR's use of targeted assassinations, known as “executive action,” and explores the methods used by the KGB to eliminate the regime's enemies both domestically and internationally. Through interviews, testimonies of defectors, and real-world cases, Sifuentes paints a chilling portrait of Soviet statecraft. 

Top Secret

Introduction: Understanding Soviet “Executive Action”

The Soviet Union employed assassination, kidnapping, and sabotage as tools to eliminate dissidents, defectors, and potential threats to the regime’s authority. These operations—euphemistically termed “liquid affairs” (Mokryye Dela)—were not confined within Soviet borders but extended worldwide, targeting Soviet expatriates, opposition figures, and even former intelligence officers. The genius of Soviet operations lies in their ability to mask foul play under the guise of natural causes or accidents, leaving no trail for investigators.


Target Selection: Dissidents and Defectors

The Soviets prioritized eliminating anti-Soviet émigrés, often leaders of influential groups abroad. The attempted assassination of Georgiy Okolovich in 1954, thwarted only by the defection of KGB officer Nikolay Khokhlov, exemplifies how critical these missions were. Other prominent cases include the poisoning of Ukrainian writer Lev Rebet and nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, both killed with advanced vaporized poison guns disguised as heart attacks. These operations demonstrate not only ruthless efficiency but also a desire to instill fear within émigré communities, discouraging defection or opposition.


The 13th Department: The KGB’s Execution Arm

The 13th Department of the KGB, responsible for these operations, was designed with global jurisdiction. The department's emphasis was on sabotage, assassination, and disinformation, with primary targets being the U.S. and NATO allies. Personnel were meticulously trained in a wide array of skills, including surveillance, firearms, and the use of poisons. The secrecy surrounding these missions is unparalleled—documents never circulated, and operations were often performed by local agents to avoid direct Soviet attribution.


Weapon Innovation: The Art of Subtlety and Precision

The Soviet brilliance in assassination lies in their ability to develop ingenious killing devices. One such example is a pneumatically-operated poison gun capable of delivering a lethal vapor without leaving physical evidence. This weapon was used to murder Bandera, with death occurring within minutes, leaving the illusion of a natural cause. Similarly, the KGB developed a gas pistol powered by a 300-volt battery, which could release 20 lethal gas bursts in seconds. These inventions highlight the USSR's technological edge and commitment to untraceable operations.


Operations Abroad: Fear and Control

Beyond physical assassination, the KGB employed psychological tactics to discredit and neutralize enemies. In the 1950s, they coordinated sabotage campaigns in West Germany by vandalizing synagogues and painting swastikas to stir public unrest and implicate the local government. The abduction of Dr. Walter Linse from West Berlin in 1952 further showcases how Soviet operations blurred the line between kidnapping and assassination. The KGB worked with satellite intelligence agencies, often disguising murders as suicides or accidents, as seen in the unexplained deaths of former Soviet officials Ignace Reiss and Walter Krivitsky.


Trends and Adaptations: A Shift from Murder to Sabotage

While assassinations declined after Stalin’s death, the Soviets shifted focus to sabotage and propaganda, viewing abductions as more beneficial than murder. Kidnapped individuals provided valuable intelligence and could be exploited for propaganda by portraying them as defectors. However, the KGB remained ready to kill defectors when necessary, as evidenced by cases like Vladimir Petrov, whose wife was almost forcibly returned to the USSR. The underlying logic was clear: No betrayal would go unanswered.


Techniques in Poisoning and Psychological Control

The Soviet mastery in poisons was legendary. Substances such as arsenic, thallium, and scopolamine were carefully selected to ensure that deaths appeared natural. In one notable case, defectors reported that the USSR maintained secret laboratories dedicated to the development of untraceable poisons. These substances were tested on prisoners, ensuring maximum lethality while evading forensic detection. The poison vapor gun and other delivery methods reflect Soviet ingenuity, as the weapons could incapacitate without leaving a trace, rendering autopsies ineffective.


Concluding Remarks: The Genius of Soviet Intelligence

Eduardo Sifuentes’s report offers a sobering insight into the brilliance and ruthlessness of Soviet intelligence operations. From precision assassinations to complex psychological operations, the USSR demonstrated unparalleled sophistication. Their ability to adapt tactics—from murder to sabotage—while maintaining global influence underscores the profound threat they posed to the West.

The report emphasizes that Soviet executive action was not just about eliminating individuals but about sending a message: no enemy of the regime was beyond reach. This strategy not only silenced dissent but also ensured that fear and uncertainty permeated the opposition.


Impact and Legacy: Lessons for Modern Intelligence

The KGB’s approach to covert operations remains a benchmark in intelligence circles. Sifuentes’s report serves as a blueprint for understanding how statecraft, sabotage, and assassination intertwine in geopolitical conflict. The use of deception, local operatives, and advanced technology continues to inspire modern intelligence agencies. The legacy of these operations serves as both a warning and a lesson: power is not only demonstrated by what can be seen but also by what is deliberately hidden.

Top Secret


Thursday, 10 October 2024

Secret investigation into the Cuban missile crisis, logistical trajectory. CIA intelligence error

Department of Defense | Research

Intelligence Analysis: Secret investigation into the Cuban missile crisis, logistical trajectory. CIA intelligence error

by Dr. E. Sifuentes | Central Intelligence Agency                          



Most often, in military intelligence, photographs are studied with the purpose of establishing military capabilities. Barracks, revetments, and launchers are counted to determine order-of-battle strength. Missiles, tanks, and submarines are measured to determine their characteristics. In one case, however, this process led to an unusual cornbination of photographs and the belated discovery of a Soviet operation that had peaked at the crucial juncture between the buildup and withdrawal of strategic missiles in Cuba.

Quick Round Trip 

In January 1963, long after the most critical days of the Cuban crisis, a stack of photographs taken in early October of Soviet naval bases in the Kola Inlet arrived in Washington. One of these, showing a merchant ship at the Guba Okolnaya submarine missile support facility, touched off the analytic chase. 

A civilian ship at this highly secure missile installation seemed incongruous enough to make a check on the Guba Okolnaya files worth while. Photos dating back several years were reviewed. No other while. Photos dating back several years were reviewed. No other merchant ships were seen. No component of the U.S. intelligence community had evidence that any cargo ships except naval auxiliaries ever put into the base. The presence of this ship, the Alexandrovsk, was now clearly unusual and called for further analytic inquiry.

The date of the photographs, 3 October, sugested a line of attack. This was shortly after the first deliveries of IL 28's and MRBM's to Cuba. Could the Alexandrovsk have been Cuba bound and could she have carried a military cargo? If so, what would the particular cargo be and why was it being shipped from this Arctic base when all other such shipments, as far as we knew, had been made from Baltic and Black Sea ports? 

Aerial photographs of all ships bound for Cuba were reexamined. No Alexandrovsk. The odds were against her having slipped through the U.S. air surveillance net; three out of every four ships going to Cuba had been picked up. Interest in the Alexandrovsk waned, and her presence at the naval base seemed likely to become just another in the long list of unsolved intelligence anomalies.

One routine step remained, however -- to review all the photographs of ships returning from Cuba to the Soviet Union. This was done, and eureka! there she was. A naval aircraft had picked her up on 10 November, position 26°30' North, 53°17' West, traveling light and fast, as shown below. Moreover, several interesting vehicles, including six missile nose cone vans, were on board (toward stern). Though other vessels would also leave Cuba with such nose cone vans, the Alexandrovsk had been one of the first to leave. Partially opened hatches sugested that additional personnel may have been on board, living in the 'tween-deck area. Research was again stepped up. 

One routine step remained, however -- to review all the photographs of ships returning from Cuba to the Soviet Union. This was done, and eureka! there she was. A naval aircraft had picked her up on 10 November, position 26°30' North, 53°17' West, traveling light and fast, as shown below. Moreover, several interesting vehicles, including six missile nose cone vans, were on board (toward stern). Though other vessels would also leave Cuba with such nose cone vans, the Alexandrovsk had been one of the first to leave. Partially opened hatches sugested that additional personnel may have been on board, living in the 'tween-deck area. Research was again stepped up. 

More facts were excavated. Checks of shipping data now showed that the Alexandrovsk was an old-timer in the Cuba trade but all her previous voyages had originated in the Baltic. In further restudy of air photography of Cuban ports it was found that she was at Mariel on 3 November. (She may have escaped surveillance on the way in by taking an unusual, southerly course, perhaps for that very purpose.) At Guba Okolnaya, it was known, nuclear warheads were probably stored and serviced; the presence of submarine missiles was certain. Also of interest at this base was a cement arch building near the waterfront that very closely resembled those built near missile sites in Cuba. Finally, newer photography of Guba Okolnaya showed the Alexandrovsk Finally, newer photography of Guba Okolnaya showed the Alexandrovsk back there on 23 November with the vehicles still on deck 

CHRONOLOGY AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1962

August:

  • Early August:
    • First activity at SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) sites and cruise missile sites noted.
    • Komar-class cruise missile boats arrive.
  • Late August:
    • First known delivery of MIG-21 fighters.
    • First activity at IRBM/MRBM (Intermediate-Range and Medium-Range Ballistic Missile) sites.

September:

  • Late September:
    • First known delivery of MRBM missiles to launch sites.
    • First known delivery of IL-28 jet light bombers.
    • Alexandrovsk arrives at Kola Inlet.

October:

  • Early October:

    • First identified flight of MIG-21 fighters.
    • Alexandrovsk at Guba Okolnaya submarine missile facility on 5 October.
  • Late October:

    • Quarantine proclamation on 23 October.
    • Soviet ground force encampments occupied.
    • Alexandrovsk likely arrived in Cuba just before the quarantine.

November:

  • Early November:

    • Soviets begin dismantling MRBM/IRBM sites.
    • MRBM/IRBM missiles are taken out of Cuba.
    • Alexandrovsk at Mariel on 3 November.
    • Alexandrovsk photographed at sea with nose cone vans on deck, 10 November.
    • Alexandrovsk returns to Cuba Okolnaya base.


Deadly Burden
 

The schedule of the Alexandrovsk now established and all available intelligence on the ship wrung out, it remained to determine the nature of her cargo. In early 1963, in the midst of rumors of missiles still in Cuba, underwater launchers, and strategic weapons stored in caves, any information on just what the Soviets had sent in or taken out was still of high interest. Moreover, the exact characteristics of the military buildup were important in evaluating Soviet intentions then and later. 

Collecting information on this particular shipment had been difficult; analyzing it was much more so. Lists of plausible and possible cargoes were prepared, measured against likely Soviet requirements, and then examined in context of what the Cuba Okolnaya base could supply. Hypothesis after hypothesis was shot down. Were the Soviets. sending submarine ballistic missiles to Cuba? Unlikely. How about nuclear bombs for the IL-28 bombers? Also, unlikely. At one point no hypotheses were left. But a few, phoenix-like, rose from the analytic ash pile.

One of the most plausible possibilities, and certainly the most significant, was that MRBM nuclear warheads had been carried by the Alexandrovsk. Evidence bearing on this hypothesis and on related questions was again sifted. Was Cuba Okolnaya a likely transshipment point for MRBM equipment? Were naval and Strategic Rocket Force nuclear warheads interchangeable? Finally, were some of the basic identifications used in the analysis correct? Were "missile nose cone vans" really missile nose cone vans? Were cement arch buildings actually meant for nuclear warhead storage? In both cases the answer was a qualified yes. 

Clearly the Soviets had intended to send nuclear warheads to Cuba; their strategic missiles were useless without them. What was not certain was whether they actually arrived, and this question seemed worth trying to answer even months after the crucial October/November period. If they had not been delivered the Soviets would have had no capability at all for attacking the United States with Cuba-based missiles during the crisis, and this might have had some bearing on their abject withdrawal. If, on the other hand, the warheads were present, the Soviet surrender was even more complete.

Overhead photography of Cuban installations had shown warhead handling and storage facilities to have been constructed but could neither establish nor rule out the presence of the warheads themselves. neither establish nor rule out the presence of the warheads themselves.  

A few Soviet public statements had implied that they were present, and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov said that nuclear warheads were taken out of Cuba immediately after the decision was made to remove the missiles. This, if true, would fit in with the fact that the Alexandrovsk was one of the first ships to leave after the decision. But there was no really cogent reason for believing the Soviet statements. 

Additional research did not resolve the Alexandrovsk question conclusively, but it did sharpen the picture of what was and what was not known. It was clear that the Alexandrovsk did make an unusual voyage to and from Cuba during a critical period. She called at the probable nuclear storage facility at Guba Okolnaya before her outbound voyage and again on her return, when she carried a deck cargo of nose cone vans. If the Soviets had wanted to avoid having an incoming shipment of nuclear warheads monitored for radioactivity in the Turkish or Danish Straits, the simplest way would have been to send them from the north. It could be concluded that the Alexandrovsk may have carried some. 

Thus ended a three months' chase which involved intelligence from a wide variety of scattered sources and analytic assistance from several organizations in the intelligence community. The results were only presumptive; we will probably never learn with assurance what the ship carried. But the exercise provided at least a small increment in our understanding of the Cuban crisis.

TOP SECRET



The Interpreter as an Agent

The assignment of an interpreter with slightly ulterior motives for selected international visits yields a net gain. 

Eduardo S. Sifuentes 

The rather obvious time-honored practice of using interpreters assigned to international exchange delegations as intelligence agents (or, conversely, of getting intelligence personnel assigned as interpreters) has both advantages and disadvantages. If the interpreter makes the most of his intelligence mission, however, and observes some commonsense rules of behavior, there can be a net advantage both in the direct yield of information from such an assignment and in the improvement of an asset in the person of the interpreter. The advantage in immediate information is likely to be limited; the improvement of personal assets can be considerable. 

In discussing these advantages we shall assume that the interpreter can be given adequate intelligence training and briefing (or that the intelligence officer is competent as an interpreter, and not compromised). We shall ignore the technical aspects of the interpreter's art and the occupational diseases, nervous indigestion and undernourishment, contracted in his attempts to gulp food while translating banquet conversations. We shall examine his domestic and foreign assignments separately: the advantages and disadvantages of assignment at home and abroad often coincide, but there are also important differences. 

Gains on Home Ground 

Let us look first at the domestic assignment, where the interpreter is on his own native soil, attached to a group of foreign visitors or delegates. As the communications link between the visitors and their strange surroundings, he possesses a strong psychological advantage in his available option to confine himself strictly to the business portions of the trip, leaving the visitors to fend for themselves in their spare time. Even if they have their own interpreter along, there are a number of matters--shopping, local customs, the availability of services--in which it would be convenient for them to have his help. 

Recognizing their dependence on his cooperation for the smooth progress of their visit, they will usually do their best to establish, if not a cordial friendship, at least a good working relationship. A great deal depends on the interpreter himself, of course, but normal friendly overtures on his part will usually be met at least half way by the visitors. Just by being relaxed and perhaps willing to do a small extra favor here and there, he can become accepted as an indispensable member of their family group. An excellent way to break down reserve and promote a free exchange of ideas is to invite the group to his home. (It does not pay for him to be so obliging that he becomes a valet, and it is advisable to establish this principle early in the game.)

Continued friendly gestures are likely to result in time in the establishment of a genuine rapport, with its attendant benefits. If the interpreter is knowledgeable in the field of the official discussions which he is interpreting, he can clarify in private discussions with the visitors some of the ambiguous or contradictory statements made during the official talks. Without appearing too curious or asking too many questions of intelligence purport (he should be particularly circumspect at the outset of a trip, when his bona fides is subject to greatest suspicion), he will sometimes be able to get definitive statements in private which are lacking in the confusion and interruptions of official discussions. It is here that he may bring to bear his training or natural bent for elicitation, whether for official purposes or for his own education.

At the same time the interpreter himself is the target of numerous questions which reveal both intelligence and personal interests on the part of his charges. Their intelligence questions may indicate gaps in p g ellig e que y in e g p their own service's information, and their personal ones are more broadly useful in showing the preconceived picture of this country that the visitors have brought with them. Although they often realize that their questions betray a lack of sophistication, they are willing to sacrifice dignity to satisfy their burning curiosity. Honest, natural answers, despite the apparent rudeness of some of the questions ("How much do you make? How much are you in debt?"), strengthen the interpreter's position and may lead to even more revealing questions. If the visitors are from a controlled society the very opportunity to put certain kinds of questions is a luxury they cannot afford at home. And when one of them is alone with the interpreter he often shows eagerness to ask questions of a kind not brought up in group discussions.  

In all these discussions the interpreter is gaining knowledge which no academic training can give him. First, he is given a glimpse of his own country through the warped glass of foreign misconceptions and propaganda. The image will not be fully that which hostile propagandists have sought to fix, but it will show where they have succeeded and where they have failed. Second, he learns how to get ideas across to these representatives of another culture, learns where he must explain at length and where he can make a telling point in just a few words. Finally, as a sort of synthesis of his experience, he can arrive at some conclusions concerning the visitors' inner thought processes, often quite alien to his own. 

In addition to gaining these insights, the interpreter makes what may prove to be useful contacts in future assignments. How potentially useful depends on the spirit in which he parts company with the visitors, but anything short of outright hostility is likely to make them of some value.

Drawbacks and Limitations 

The chief disadvantages of domestic assignment for the agentinterpreter lie in the shallowness of his cover. Visitors from Communist countries, in particular, start with a strong presumption that any interpreter is at least working hand in glove with local intelligence or security groups if he is not actually a member of one. The barrier thus y g up tually a m imposed in the initial stages of a trip may break down as rapport is established, but there always remains a lurking suspicion that the interpreter is not what he seems, and the visitors are always on guard against the slightest hint of prying or propaganda. Furthermore, they collect a large file of biographic information. on him in the course of their association, material which is certainly delivered to their own security forces. Matching this up with some earlier trace they may have of him may blow his organizational connections. 

Another limiting factor is that foreign delegations, particularly from Bloc countries, are drawn from the elite and so not typical of the peoples they represent. The impressions the interpreter receives concerning their beliefs and feelings may not be applicable to their countrymen at home. Though the delegation members may not be as orthodox abroad as on their home ground, where conformity is obligatory, they have a more compelling stake in the regime than the average citizen.

The last disadvantage to be noted depends in large part on the capabilities and limitations of the interpreter himself. It lies in the difficulty of retaining facts and figures in one's head while performing the complicated task of translation. It is possible to store in one's mind only a limited number of figures before the whole delicate structure of memory disintegrates into a jumble of confused statistics which are of no use to anyone. While it is permissible to take notes during long speeches where it is obviously impossible to remember everything said between pauses, this device is not appropriate for short conversations. If the interpreter is caught frantically scribbling notes immediately after a visitor has casually let drop the annual production of some electronic gadget, his usefulness to intelligence has largely evaporated. Furthermore, he has pinpointed an area of intelligence interest. A dash to the toilet after some particularly significant slip on the part of a visitor can sometimes provide privacy for note taking, but too frequent use of this dodge excites embarrassing commiseration or, more often, suspicion. 

On the Opponent's Home Field 

The foreign assignment differs in many respects from the domestic. On eig sig y r sp the profit side, in addition to getting the same positive intelligence take as the domestic interpreter, the interpreter abroad can be an observer, reporting on things which have nothing to do with his linguistic job. If he has had proper training, such observations can be quite valuable. Furthermore, he can acquire a feeling for the country and a sense of what intelligence activities can be undertaken and what cannot. He may, for example, attempt photography in areas on the borderline of legitimacy just to test reaction, or take a stroll before going to bed in order to check surveillance patterns. If he is an area specialist, the trip provides an education which no amount of book learning could give. He confirms certain of his preconceptions while discarding others, and he returns with a far more solid grasp on his specialty than he had previously. The confidence thus gained from firsthand experience is a very valuable asset if he is to be involved in operations against the country in the future. 

On the negative side we find all the disadvantages noted in the domestic assignment: the interpreter accompanying a delegation abroad is, if anything, under sharper scrutiny as a probable agent, and should be prepared for a more or less clandestine search of his bagage; his memory is still strained to hold on to useful data; his official foreign contacts are the most loyal stalwarts of the regime; his digestion deteriorates. In addition, he finds himself a prisoner of his cover profession. Whereas the foreign delegation's dependence on him during his domestic assignment led to enlightening discussions, his own party's need for his help, not only on official matters but on everything that requires communication during every waking hour, now obliges him to spend all of his time with his own countrymen. He becomes a communications machine, unable to introduce any of his own ideas or queries into the conversations. Contacts are pretty well limited to those which the hosts have thoughtfully provided for about eighteen out of every twenty-four hours, and a delegation of six-foot Americans accompanied by watchful hosts is not the sort of group which a dissident member of a closed society is likely to approach in order to unload his true feelings about the regime.  

Finally, even the diffident admissions of ignorance implicit in questions put to the interpreter on his own home ground are lacking when he goes abroad. Particularly in Communist countries the officials he contacts need to show that they have not been contaminated by his ideology; each tries to out-party-line the rest, less as an effort (usually counterproductive) to influence the visiting delegation than as a demonstration pr ) t e visiting deleg of his own orthodoxy for the benefit of his comrades. This compulsion precludes any serious discussion about either the hosts' or the visitors' country. During such exhibitions of chest-beating the interpreter is put on his mettle to hold his temper and restrain himself from active participation in the conversation.

Criteria and Other Considerations 

From the foregoing we may conclude that the principal intelligence value of the domestic assignment lies in the psychological field--exploration of mental attitudes, blind spots, thought processes, strength and weakness of beliefs--whereas the value of the foreign assignment derives from first-hand experience in the country and from the collection of observable operational and positive intelligence. It is perhaps unnecessary to warn that the interpreter can not fulfill the classic agent roles of recruiting spy nets, agitating for revolution, or personally stealing the master war plans. He will pay his way by less dramatic acts.  

Here are some of the factors that should be taken into consideration in recruiting an interpreter for an intelligence mission or utilizing an existing intelligence asset in interpreter capacity. First, it must be borne in mind that almost any interpreter will be the target of intense scrutiny by the opposition, particularly in Bloc countries. The prevailing political climate today, however, is such that the interpreter's official position as part of a delegation protects him from arbitrary arrest, except perhaps in Communist China. The rest of the Bloc is so committed to East-West exchanges that it would not jeopardize the program for one rather insignificant intelligence fish. 

Second, the interpreter should not be the only briefed member of the delegation going abroad. As we have shown, the interpreter has his hands full with his official duties and has little opportunity for taking notes. The official delegate, however, has good opportunities and excellent cover for taking notes. In addition, being presumably an expert in the field of the discussions, he can recognize significant material better than the interpreter. 

Third, the size of the delegation is an extremely important factor affecting the usefulness of both domestic and: foreign interpreter assignments. A delegation of more than six or seven people imposes such a burden on the interpreter that he has no time for an intelligence mission. He is kept continually busy rounding up strays, making travel reservations, getting people settled in hotels, and generally playing nurse-maid. The best possible delegation would consist of one very lazy man who neither demanded nor rejected the presence of the interpreter. 

Finally, the itinerary itself must be considered. On domestic assignments the most important thing is a relaxed schedule which will give the visitors enough spare time to observe their surroundings and ask questions about non-official matters. On the foreign assignment perhaps the most important consideration is the previous accessibility of the areas to be visited. If the area is completely off the beaten track or had previously been closed to foreigners, there is excellent reason to employ a trained observer as interpreter. Even the standard tourist trips, however, may provide useful information if the interpreter is alert.

This paper has been oriented primarily towards the interpreter-agent question as it obtains in visits to or from the Soviet Bloc, but many of the same factors are valid for neutralist or uncommitted areas. With the steady increase in cultural and professional exchanges among most countries of the world, opportunities for placing interpreters have also expanded. The expansion is not only making more experience and training available but is affording better cover for interpreters with intelligence objectives. Perhaps more of them should be given such objectives, despite the drawbacks we have noted.  




Sunday, 30 October 2022

Psywar in Intelligence Operations

 

U.S. Department of Defense | Research

Intelligence Analysis: Psywar in Intelligence Operations CSI

30 October 2022 Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

Washington, D.C. October 2022

by Dr. E. Sifuentes and Dr. L. Warren | Central Intelligence Agency                           


   




Interlocking aspects of the intelligence and psychological warfare functions. 

Eduardo Sifuentes

The intelligence operator, whether collector or analyst, in any Western nation engaged in a defense effort against the Sino-Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement has at least four major reasons to take an active interest in psychological warfare. First, much of the information he collects or analyzes is of value primarily for psywar purposes. Second, psywar may, and does, influence his operational environment and so affects the availability of information to him. Third, intelligence operations have an intrinsic psywar significance, immediate or latent, intentional or unintentional. Fourth, psywar operations, under the specific condition of cold war with the Sino-Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement, require effective clandestine support, which can be provided best by intelligence personnel knowledgeable in the requirements of covert activity. 


Psywar as Intelligence Customer

The intelligence officer is not inspired by the purpose of merely collecting and evaluating information or making analytic studies. His mission is not an end in itself, but a means to an end -- a contribution to the defense and foreign policy objectives of his country. His work is therefore meaningful only to the extent that the information he provides is utilized through appropriate action. The individual operator's performance, to be sure, does not lose merit if significant information which he acquired in due time and reported to proper sig quir ep o prop authority is not acted upon; but the intelligence organization as a whole has failed to function effectively if the information it produces does not lead to some kind of policy determination or action.

In some fields the relationship of an item of information to a course of action is simple and obvious. Data on a new enemy weapon, for instance, transmitted to the armed services, will enable them to develop a similar innovation, to devise a defense against it, or at least to alert combat; troops to the new hazard it represents. Or intelligence about another country's plans for tactics at a diplomatic conference will enable the collecting country's diplomats to adjust their own preparations accordingly.

Less self-evident are the customer to be informed and the appropriate actions to be taken on some of the widely variegated types of information which can be generally classed as "of psywar value." Traditional political and economic reporting, in addition to its importance for policy agencies, often has relevance to psywar operations; a shift in Soviet production from military hardware to consumer goods interests not only diplomats and military planners but also propagandists. Psywar needs sociological and psychological data which can be obtained by overt research, for example the relative influence of established religion and atheist indoctrination on the populations of Communist countries. Operational data may be of psywar significance, such as the covert Communist control of ostensibly non-Communist mass communications media or Communist influence on political parties and other power factors in the non-Communist world.

 It is not enough that the intelligence operator should recognize the psywar value of his information and transmit it to a customer authorized to act on it. In the field of psychological warfare, as in any other segment of intelligence collection, the customer's requirements determine what is to be collected, the priority assigned it, and whether only information on the national, policymaking level or also particularized data on lower levels is to be sought. These requirements of the customer depend in turn upon his plans and capabilities for action. The relationship between intelligence collector and customer in the psywar field must therefore be a mutual one. Support and guidance must flow both ways.

The Communist intelligence officer has no problem in getting his information acted upon: the Party takes action either through its own organization, usually the Agitprop or Foreign Relations department of its Central Secretariat, or indirectly, through the government intelligence services or the front organizations it controls, on all intelligence of psywar value. The Western nations have no organs with functions even remotely comparable to those of a Communist party, especially one in power; they have to take action on psywar intelligence primarily through a government agency. 


Psywar as Intelligence Aid 

The intelligence operator's chances of success or failure depend not only upon the determination, skill, professional equipment, and other assets that he and his organization bring to bear, but also upon the environment in which he is operating. Some elements of this environment are in a sense objective: he must travel and communicate over certain distances, he must avoid certain controls, he must counter the opposition. Other elements, however, are psychological -- the extent and intensity of friendliness or hostility with which his and the opposition's course are viewed by actual or potential agents, or by any persons in a position to help or hinder their activities; the apparent superiority of one side or the other in the eyes of those in between; morale and loyalty in the opposition's ranks; and so forth.

These psychological elements in the operational climate can be of decisive importance. The operations of Hitler's Gestapo against the outlawed German Communist Party were greatly assisted by the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda in mobilizing the active support of large parts of the population for this work. When the same Gestapo was later sent into France and other Nazi-occupied countries to cope with the Communist underground there, it was far less successful. It must have been largely the change in operational climate, not any deterioration in the professional skill of Hitler's security and intelligence services, which led from the effective liquidation of the German Communist underground to the Nazis' failure to suppress the Communists in the countries their armies had effectively occupied.

15  years ago the West surfaced Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th CPSU Congress and gave the text world-wide publicity. The impact of this revelation of Stalin's crimes upon Communists and non-Communists alike benefited Western intelligence operations in many ways: it induced defections, it lowered morale in Communist ranks, it increased people's readiness to assist the West and thereby markedly improved the operational climate.

Intelligence operators need not wait for windfalls to improve the operational climate upon which so much depends in their work. They can contribute actively to Psywar operations which, either as their main objective or as a byproduct, will modify the operational climate in the desired direction. Intelligence collection and Psywar objectives coincide in this aspect of operations. 


Psywar as Intelligence Product 

Some intelligence operations, especially ones of a tactical and technical ellig e op sp cially on nature, carry, whether incidentally or by main intent, a significant Psywar impact. A psychological purpose is central to deception operations that mislead the opposition by playing false information into its hands or staging ostensible operations against a false target. The incidental psychological effect of other intelligence operations may influence not only the opposition but other groups and populations at large.

 The obvious success of an intelligence operation may impress both friend and foe. At one stage in World War II, Allied aircraft attacked a new underground headquarters of the German Supreme Command within 24 hours after it had been put into service; and years after the war the inhabitants of the area were still discussing with awe the efficiency of Western espionage. It does not matter whether that air attack was really the product of espionage, the result of aerial reconnaissance, or merely a lucky accident: whatever the historic truth, the depth of the psychological impact for a long time after the event was startling.

Although most intelligence operations are carried out with the knowledge of only a very limited number of persons, a large-scale psychological effect is often produced when they are later exposed and publicized by the originating service or by the opposition. The results do not always coincide with the intentions of the side that provides the publicity. Several years ago, for instance, the Soviets in Berlin discovered that a Western service had tapped their communication lines by means of a tunnel dug under the sector border. They decided to give this perfidious trick as much publicity as they could, and they brought busloads of correspondents, domestic and foreign, to the site. The ensuing publicity, however, was for the most part quite different from what they expected: many people in Germany and throughout Western Europe were impressed by the feat and reassured by this evidence that the West was capable of matching wits with the Soviets.

Intelligence officers ought to give careful consideration to the potential of proposed operations for psychological flap or psychological advantage in event of exposure. Further, they should examine the possibilities for intentional psywar use of operations of their own or of the opposition. 

Psywar as Covert Operation 

In the cold war, the United States and her allies find themselves mostly on the defensive, which means, among other things, that their antagonists have the first choice of weapons, battlefields, and timetables. The Communists have chosen primarily political weapons -- agitation and propaganda, mass organizations, subversion. Although they do not eschew the use of more orthodox means in the international arena -- armed forces, economic warfare, diplomacy -- these are subordinated to the political bias of the controlling diploma y -- th e p olling Communist Party.  

The cold war is therefore being fought mainly with the weapons of psychological warfare, taken in its broadest meaning to denote the whole range of manifestations from propaganda and various kinds of national penetration to the political-psychological effects of the respective antagonists' achievement in orthodox activities -- military power, economic strength, social stability, national morale, and so forth. There are other reasons for this hegemony of the psychological, too, among them the reluctance of governments to risk nuclear war in pursuit of their national objectives, the extraordinary new efficiency, range, and speed of mass communications, and the rapid rise of literacy rates in all parts of the world.

On the Communist side, these weapons are wielded mainly by ostensibly nongovernment agencies, the Communist parties and their innumerable fronts and auxiliary organizations. This setup enables a Communist government to disclaim formally the responsibility for whatever these groups may be doing in another country. It also provides a huge, specialized apparatus devoted largely to the conduct of the cold war, endowed with enormous manpower reserves - - the 85 Communist parties alone have more than 30 million card-carrying members, of whom several hundred thousand are full-time activists -- and backed by the massive financial and technical resources of twelve totalitarian dictatorships.

On the Communist side, these weapons are wielded mainly by ostensibly nongovernment agencies, the Communist parties and their innumerable fronts and auxiliary organizations. This setup enables a Communist government to disclaim formally the responsibility for whatever these groups may be doing in another country. It also provides a huge, specialized apparatus devoted largely to the conduct of the cold war, endowed with enormous manpower reserves - - the 85 Communist parties alone have more than 30 million card-carrying members, of whom several hundred thousand are full-time activists -- and backed by the massive financial and technical resources of twelve totalitarian dictatorships.

The mass organizations of the non-Communist world -- political parties, labor unions, veterans' associations, and the like -- though capable of playing a significant role in the cold war, are by themselves no match for the world-wide Communist machine. Most of them exist for some strictly limited purpose such as getting their representatives elected to parliament or obtaining better working conditions for their members; they cannot compete with a movement whose central and pervasive purpose is to bring all mankind under the dictatorship of the proletariat and thus decisively to change the course of history. In countries where the Communist movement is comparatively weak, political groups, however anti-Communist in their basic attitudes, naturally spend a far greater amount of their energies in competing with each other than in fighting the cold war. But even in countries like Italy, France, India, or Japan, where the Communists are strong and well organized, the spontaneous anti-Communist efforts of political parties and other mass organizations are inadequate, being limited to opposing the local Communists at the polls and in shop steward elections and similar contests, without mounting any effective counteroffensive against world Communism beyond their borders.

 These private efforts can make a successful contribution in the cold war only if they are all coordinated, supported, and supplemented by government action. But since the psywar weapon chosen by the Communists involves activities which, when not entirely clandestine, must have their government sponsorship disguised, the regular agencies of a democratic government in peace time (and the cold war, for all that its outcome will be of more decisive significance for mankind than that of a good many shooting wars in earlier phases of history, is technically considered a state of peace) would find it difficult to meet the Communist drive on the scale and with the militancy required.

The conduct of the West's psywar effort is therefore inextricably bound up with the intelligence function. This phase of national defense has to be carried out by clandestine means not attributable to the sponsoring government. It has to depend on intelligence techniques such as cover, foreign agents, the penetration of hostile organizations, and third-country operations, as well as utilize information obtained by clandestine collection. Organizationally, however, responsibility for psywar may be assigned in any of three ways--to the same organization and the same personnel that collect intelligence; to the same organization which collects intelligence but to separate units and different personnel; or to an independent organization, connected only through liaison arrangements with the collecting service.

The decision as to which of these three ways should be chosen in a given country and at a given time has to be made at top level and will be governed by a variety of considerations. Regardless which organizational form is selected for psywar, however, the intimate relationships with intelligence outlined above will remain. We are faced with three alternatives in the cold war -- to surrender peacefully ("better red than dead," as the pacifists say); to leave the decision to World War III; or to fight world Communism at least to a standstill, forcing it by means short of general war, i.e., by successful psychological warfare, to abandon its world drive. Taking cognizance that this is the choice, everyone in the intelligence community, whatever his specific function, ought to give psywar operations his unstinting support.  


Sunday, 9 October 2022

Intelligence protocols for Operational Contacts



Center for the Study of Intelligence | Research

Intelligence Research: Intelligence protocols for Operational Contacts 

10 October 2022 Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

Washington, D.C. October 2022

by Dr. E. Sifuentes | Intelligence Agency 


Intelligence research on the holding of meetings with agents.
 
E. S. Sifuentes l Code Name: CZ1oo3 

Personal contacts with agents are conditioned by a series of mutually related factors among which the following are basic: 

  • The situation, maturity, and importance of the agent. 
  • What is to be accomplished by the meeting. 
  • The professional skill and the legal status of case officer and agent. 
  • The timing, duration, and place of the meeting. Prevailing operational conditions. 


Qualit of the Agent


If an agent is sufficiently trusted and if he supplies valuable information, personal contact with him should be reduced to a minimum. For the intervals it suffices to work out a plan for either to summon the other to a meeting in case of emergency. 

Even in meetings with a tested and reliable agent much attention is paid to security as well as to the fulfillment of intelligence requirements; but in working with an agent who has not been fully assessed and vetted, the prime emphasis is put on vigilance and checking-has he been planted by the local counterintelligence, are his motives in agreeing to collaborate sincere? The need for personal meetings with such an agent is increased, for they give the opportunity to assess him more completely. But the meetings must be conducted with caution. In 2022 an officer assigned to a certain residency 2 submitted a plan for a thirdcountry meeting with an agent who had been recently and hurriedly recruited and not thoroughly assessed. Headquarters warned the resident 3 of the need for precautionary measures, and in this it proved to be correct: the agent brought along counterintelligence officers to the meeting site. The resident's application of precautionary measures and the case officer's observance of correct operating techniques en route to the meeting made possible the deflection of a serious provocation by adversary counterintelligence. One should not neglect personal meetings with agents who are not sources of important information. Agents performing support roles are also essential to the service and should be appreciated. If a Soviet intelligence officer on an illegal assignment is supplied cover by an auxiliary agent, his fate depends upon that agent.

In general, whatever an agent's role in the intelligence net, personal contact should be made with him only when it is impossible to manage without it. The number of meetings should be kept as low as possible, especially with sources of valuable information. This principle holds for all residencies and agent group but particularly for residencies under legal cover in countries which have severe counterintelligence practices. 

Purpose of Meetings


Personal meetings may be held to give an agent his next assignment and instructions for carrying it out, to train him in tradecraft or the use of technical or communications equipment, to transmit documents, reports, technical equipment, money, or other items, or to fulfill several of these purposes. In actual practice several purposes are usually served by a meeting. In addition to its particular objectives more general needs can be filled. A meeting held for training purposes may be a means for clarifying biographic data on the agent or his views on various subjects. At every meeting with an agent one should study him and obtain new data on his potential and talents, thereby providing a better basis for judging his sincerity and deciding how much trust to place in him.

These various objectives require different kinds of meeting in terms of frequency, duration, and choice of time and place.

 Professional Skill


Success in face-to-face handling depends to a large degree on the professional authority of the handler, his knowledge of the business, the firmness of his will, his adherence to principle, and his ability to get along with people. Above all else is dedication to the assignment and a positive resolve to achieve success and fulfill the assigned tasks.

Vigilance in protecting one's activity and intentions not only from counterintelligence but also from the agent requires a developed intuition, the power of observation, and an ability to retain the initiative and assert one's will tactfully. 

  Some case officers lose the initiative during agent meetings by wasting time discussing secondary matters or problems in no way related to the purpose of the meeting and end up failing to attain the objectives for which the meeting had been set up. Recently, for example, a case officer from one of our residencies under legal cover was asked to make a quick contact with an agent in order to transmit to him Headquarters' decision that he should immediately leave the country because of impending danger. Instead of executing these instructions immediately, the case officer devoted a meeting to completely unnecessary conversation about the agent's status in the country, means of communication, legal documentation, etc. Then he ordered the agent not to travel anywhere without his approval and set another meeting for six days later! The resident had to correct the situation immediately.

There have been cases in which agents have actually refused to meet with officers who exhibited incompetence in matters concerning which they themselves, as specialists, were working in behalf of Soviet intelligence. During meetings the case officers acted timid, were not serious, let their minds wander, acted stiff and formal, attempted to order the agents about, or did not show interest in the agents' problems. Or they did not give the agents satisfactory explanations of operational or contact problems, betraying thereby lack of preparation and at times confusion, which engendered doubts in the agents as to the security of working with them. Such conduct has often lost us the services of valuable agents.

 Experienced case officers are made; not born. Experience is acquired by practical work. New case officers, just beginning to work at agent operations abroad, therefore have to hold personal meetings with agents. But they learn also by example, instruction, and coaching. It is necessary to imbue them with professional skills and draw them gradually, starting with less complicated tasks, into the work of handling agents.

Legal Status


There have been instances in which agents have refused to meet with case officers whose legal position in the country was incompatible with their own situation. In particular, several agents have refused to have meetings with officers from our military attaché apparatus because if discovered by outsiders or counterintelligence they would be incriminated. The legal status of case officers and agents is of utmost significance for clandestinity, security of communications, and ability to make personal contact and must be taken into account in planning meetings.

 During the years 2019-2021 our service training suffered some bitter failures. To a significant degree these were a consequence of slackened vigilance on the part of case officers in legal residencies and of their agents. The case officers would report that meetings had been carried out under favorable conditions and there had been no external surveillance. But testimony at trials would subsequently show that counterintelligence had known not only the time and place of meetings but also their duration and details such as who the participants were and what they did, how the officers were dressed, and in one case even the color of the wrapper on a package that had been passed. There had obviously been surveillance which both case officers and agents had failed to detect. These failures occurred, not because operational conditions were terribly complicated or the adversary counterintelligence service was so skillful, but because either the case officers or the agents had forgotten to be vigilant at all times, mistaken the significance of cover and security, or done incorrect things. This was what enabled counterintelligence to arrest our agents and expel our officers from the country. At present counterintelligence practices are less severe in several of the eastern capitalist countries than in the west, but that gives no reason to weaken vigilance there. Favorable elements in any operational situation should be taken advantage of, but not by relaxing vigilance and security consciousness.

Illegal residencies and agent groups, not being subject to surveillance of the kind experienced under legal cover, can depend better on having secure personal meetings. These can be held in a relaxed atmosphere and in some instances without clandestinity. In every country there live many "welcome" foreigners, tourism is a mass phenomenon, business and family ties are widely developed; thus large human streams cross international borders. No country has a counterintelligence service with the capability to follow every foreigner, not to say every local inhabitant, in its effort to identify officers and agents of foreign intelligence services. 

This does not mean that members of illegal residencies are not subjected to any surveillance, only that its incidence on them is greatly reduced. Provided, of course, that they have not compromised themselves by mistakes or rash acts and so been placed under special observation, counterintelligence does not follow at their heels. Moreover, they have greater freedom in selecting cover stories, means of disguise, and other security measures, even in countries with the most severe counterintelligence practices.  
 

Choice of Case Ofcer


  The legal status factor should be taken into account in deciding what case officer is to be assigned to carry out any particular meeting with an agent. Initially, in legal residencies, meetings with agents are carried out by the officers who assessed and recruited them. Depending on the y th ep ding on th purpose of the meeting or the importance of the agent, they can also be held by the resident, his deputy, or a special case officer sent for this purpose from Headquarters.

Case officers in legal residencies, in the course of recruiting agents, cultivate new contacts among local inhabitants who seem to have agent potential. The development of such persons, on top of already recruited agents, brings an increasing number of personal meetings and concomitant danger of detection. In order to reduce this danger and also improve the management of the intelligence net, Headquarters splits off the most valuable agents of legal residencies and sets them up under illegal residencies or as agent groups reporting directly to Headquarters via illegal channels. 

In illegal residencies and agent groups meetings are held by the residents, their deputies, and the group leaders. A resident can assign a trusted cut-out to hold a meeting that has limited objectives such as transmitting materials. Despite the favorable conditions in illegal residencies, meetings must be planned and held in full compliance with clandestine operational doctrine. Holding them without professional planning is not permitted. Each member of an illegal residency or agent group must check constantly for clandestinity and for the security of his illegal status and make efforts to improve that status.

In principle it is undesirable to make frequent changes in the person assigned to meet an agent. It is therefore important, before assigning an officer to make contact with any agent, to think over thoroughly all the considerations presented above in order to avoid mistakes. From the point of view of security, it is also improper to set up personal contact between the radio operator of an illegal residency and agents in its network. Only the resident must know the identity of the radio operator. 

As a parallel security measure the agents of an illegal residency must not know the basic biographic data (name, nationality, addresses) on the resident, his assistants, or the cut-outs who effect the operational contact. For this reason it is better to use pseudonyms, although in practice it is not always possible. Under no circumstances should horizontal lines of personal contact be permitted, even if adherence to this doctrine necessitates excluding an agent from operational activity for some time. This is a vitally important rule, especially among valuable and trusted agents. Headquarters is responsible for personal contact arrangements with illegal residents, group leaders, and singleton case officers or agents reporting directly to Headquarters. It sends out its case officers for this purpose, either illegally with foreign documentation or officially with Soviet documentation and an appropriate cover story. The meetings can be held in the target country or in a third country. In some cases the agent may be summoned to Headquarters and the business taken care of there. In that case it is necessary to expunge from the agent's passport (or the resident's or group leader's), all notations concerning his stay in the Soviet Union.

Choice of Place  


The choice of meeting place is of considerable importance and should be made deliberately and with foresight. It has to lend itself to the objectives of the meeting, suit the positions in society of the agent and case officer, and satisfy security considerations. Meetings can be held on city streets, in parks, restaurants, cafes, reading rooms, or museums, out of town, in the suburbs, etc. The range of possibilities depends to a large degree on the creative initiative of members of the residency, conditioned by a firm knowledge of the real operational situation, local conditions, and the structure and techniques of the counterintelligence and police forces. 

Elements to be taken into account include the severity of the country's administration, the sensitivity of the police force, the extent to which police and counterintelligence check local inhabitants, foreigners, employees of Soviet installations, main highways, streets, and squares, and how well state and private buildings and transportation facilities are guarded. Similarly it is necessary to bear in mind the degree to which counterintelligence and police agents are planted in enterprises and public buildings such as theaters, museums, libraries, and restaurants. In addition to counterintelligence activity, one should consider police measures for maintaining public order, particularly the control of criminal elements and lesser violators of law and morality. In the summer of 1959, for example, two of our illegals meeting abroad found themselves in a district where the police were conducting a roundup of such elements. When they saw what was going on they took off, but could not get away y sa as going on th y t t g y without having their documents inspected by the police. The situation would have been much worse for an officer under legal cover meeting with an agent.

For prolonged meetings it is necessary to choose places which outsiders cannot observe. Frequently the agent is picked up at some predetermined place in an automobile and taken for operational work to a place chosen earlier that the agent himself had not known about. The agent's own car can also be used for this purpose. It is best not to hold conversations on operational matters in the automobile, for it is possible that a recorder might be hidden in it.

 Places for long meetings present fewer difficulties in illegal residencies. Their members can meet in their own apartments, in hotels, or in out-oftown resort areas without any special risk of suspicion. But even in illegal residencies the demands of clandestinity and security must be observed in choosing meeting places. The local operational climate and the status of the persons to take part in the meeting must be taken into account

The problem is greater in residencies under legal cover, Here it is best either to have reliable safehouses or to deliver the agent discreetly to the official residency building. The latter is a serious operational move. If neither is feasible, it is better to have Headquarters dispatch an officer to a third country, either legally or illegally, for the meeting. 

Here are some of the mistakes sometimes made by case officers of legal residencies. They hold meetings in restaurants and other public establishments located near hotels and houses where employees of Soviet installations, sometimes even the case officers themselves, reside. The service personnel in such establishments know the identities of Soviet citizens. Some of them may be counterintelligence agents, and in any case they may spot our officer holding a meeting and report to the police or the counterintelligence service. Other meetings are held near guarded compounds and government installations where more intense surveillance is maintained than elsewhere. Some case officers use the same site for successive meetings over an extended period of time. Others hold meetings in their own or the agent's apartment, sometimes taking along their wives in order to sugest a family friendship. These fail to realize that social intercourse implies a closer relationship than legitimate business relations and unquestionably will not escape notice in these days of intense counterintelligence activity.

Timing, Duration, Frequency


  In the matter of timing it is always necessary to bear in mind the current foreign policy objectives of the Soviet government so that these will not be prejudiced by any unfavorable incident arising from the operational contact. If there is any such risk the meeting should be postponed until another time. This applies to meetings with agents that are poorly assessed or insufficiently tested, particularly if there is doubt of their bona fides. It applies also when there is a possibility that the case officer will be under surveillance as he leaves for the meeting. This consideration should be borne in mind by case officers of illegal residencies but especially by those in residencies under legal cover. 

Governments of capitalist countries sometimes pursue political ends by having counterintelligence set up special provocations against Soviet officials and catch them meeting with agents or agent candidates. The object may be to compromise Soviet foreign policy, strain international relations, or strengthen the political position of the capitalist government, especially if it is currently trying to get a military or antidemocratic law through parliament. Sometimes this is done against the opposition of the counterintelligence service, for the premature detention of the Soviet officer may frustrate its effort to make a thorough study of his contacts. As a rule provocations against our officers are associated with an international or internal political development, and they are even mounted against officials who have no connection with agent operations.

Meetings should be kept as short as the transaction of the business allows. The case officer and agent must not be together without a purpose. They should not waste time discussing matters having no substantial relationship to the business at hand. This does not mean that one should talk to the agent only about business in dry bureaucratic language. Sensitivity towards the agent's interests must be developed. If the situation permits, he should be heard out even on matters which were not anticipated when the meeting was planned but which have an operational relationship and can influence his future work. But he should not be permitted to deflect the talk into a labyrinth of secondary, insignificant topics. The case officer must keep the initiative in his own hands, and he must remember that control of a meeting in a proper and businesslike manner cuts down its length.

 Frequent meetings with the same agent are unwise, especially if he is a tested and reliable one producing important secret information. Meetings with such agents can be reduced to one or two a year, or even fewer, held whenever possible in third countries. Routine transactions can be taken care of through nonpersonal forms of communication. With more ordinary agents it should not be necessary to meet oftener than once every two or three months. These limitations are of special importance for residencies under legal cover.

operational conditions


  It should be taken as axiomatic that Soviet intelligence officers under legal cover are subject to counterintelligence scrutiny in all capitalist countries, most effectively in those with severe counterintelligence practices. In some European and eastern countries the counterintelligence effort is not as intense as in the countries of the Anglo-American bloc, and the operational situation is therefore "easier." But this seeming ease never justifies reduced vigilance and securityconsciousness on the part of case officers and agents. Flaps still occur in countries where the operational situation appears to be relatively favorable, and analysis shows that flaps do not depend on the complexity or simplicity of the operational situation but are traceable to deficiencies in the camouflage of operational activity, slackening of vigilance, and neglect of cover and clandestinity. In capitalist countries of the east that have comparatively small counterintelligence apparatuses, the activities of our legal residencies still do not necessarily go without observation. The counterintelligence programs of such countries as the U.S.A., England, and France are also extended to those eastern countries and seek to undermine and compromise the favorably developing relations between them and the Soviet Union. 

The capitalist counterintelligence services exploit in this effort all the national peculiarities of which the east has many. This tactic of adversary counterintelligence carries possibilities of great unpleasantness for us. Because of the operational conditions now prevailing in capitalist countries, intelligence officers, especially those in residencies under legal cover, must seek out and apply the most reliable forms and methods of camouflage and clandestinity when meeting personally with agents. Although the holding of personal meetings has been rendered difficult for them, with proper study, good planning, and careful execution it can be successful. Counterintelligence surveillance of personnel in Soviet installations abroad is not so tight or continuous as to make operational activity impossible. As a rule it is intermittent and is shifted from one case officer to another and even to persons that have no connection with agent operations. A counterintelligence service does not possess the means for uninterrupted surveillance in all places at all times in all cities; it uses various systems, and observation teams do not work around the clock in all places. Once one understands the working patterns of a particular counterintelligence service, obstacles erected by it can be circumvented.

An agent with whom personal contact is maintained must be inculcated by his case officer with the qualities of a clandestine personality. He must be invested with the ability to camouflage himself, to exercise vigilance, to determine whether he is being observed by counterintelligence. He must have the ability to spot surveillance at his place of work or outside his place of work, especially when departing for an operational meeting. Agents' carelessness or inexperience in matters of security has often resulted in operational flaps. Some agents have failed to attach significance to the circumstance that someone, often an acquaintance or friend, began to show intensified interest in them before the compromise. They ignored changes in their relationships with coworkers and friends. They did not wonder about the appearance of new faces in their milieu. Some agents, because of inexperience or in a deliberate violation of security rules induced by personal rashness, have failed to check for surveillance when going to an operational meeting. 

Some agents go to operational meetings unprepared, without thinking out their future actions in advance, and have not planned what behavior patterns to exhibit while en route to the meeting place or in its area. Some have approached our case officers at places not stipulated as meeting sites, have telephoned the case officer at his office and discussed personal contact arrangements, or have showed up in person at the Soviet installation to see the case officer. Regardless of how skillful and vigilant a case officer may be, he can come to the attention of counterintelligence if one of his agents violates operational rules deliberately or neglects them because of inexperience. Furthermore, the agent's attitude toward cover and clandestinity when meeting with his case officer contributes to some degree to the over-all assessment of his sincerity and honesty in collaborating with Soviet intelligence. Some agents, of course, work honestly with us without adhering to the basic rules of security on the premise that no kind of surveillance is being directed at them. Nevertheless the case officer must always consider the agent's attitude toward security and train and indoctrinate him accordingly. He must seek out the reasons for every deviation by the agent from the norms of behavior he has laid down.

Planning a Meeting


  The preparation of a meeting plan is done by the handling case officer with the guidance of the resident or his deputy. It begins with the meeting's objectives and tasks, including specific problems to be resolved with the agent, the ways and order of their solution, and operational or personal problems which the agent may have and which should be settled at the meeting. If the meeting place and time previously selected are not suitable for the accomplishment of these tasks or for current operational conditions, then it is proper to make changes. The agent should be informed in advance by non-personal contact or at the agreed time and place during a brief contact. The latter procedure is the better if the scheduled meeting is imminent; it avoids confusion and possible broken contact. If it is possible that surveillance of the handling officer may endanger the meeting, then he can be replaced by another handler. 

The case officer must study the operational climate on the route of travel and in the area of the meeting place. He must be prepared to take correct stock of the situation on the spot and in case of necessity make the proper security decisions. Some case officers panic when complications arise in the operational situation in the vicinity of the meeting place. Some officers suspecting surveillance either continue according to plan, attaching no significance to their suspicions, or completely abandon the meeting without activating planned measures ple ely ab ting with ting pla to get to the bottom of the situation. If the latter, they frequently head for the automobile that brought them to the meeting area instead of going home, thus giving counterintelligence the opportunity to identify another intelligence officer, the one at the wheel of the parked automobile. Another mistake is for the case officer, instead of leaving the meeting area by a route designed to avoid encountering the agent, to take a direction that results in confrontation with him. Not suspecting danger (incidentally, the need for danger signals is not always anticipated), the agent goes right up to the case officer; and counterintelligence has caught them in contact.

The plan will include reaffirmation or replacement of agreed meeting arrangements and signals, the cover story for the meeting and the sequence of actions to be taken to substantiate it, assessment of the personal qualities of the agent and observation of his behavior, the sequence of actions to be used in checking the operational climate in the meeting area beforehand and afterward, and in case of need a check on the agent's honesty. It will include the sequence of moves to be made in the event the agent does not appear or if complications arise while the case officer is en route to the meeting area, approaching the meeting site, or actually with the agent. Finally, it will include arrangements with the support elements assigned to provide security for the meeting and the danger signals agreed upon.

 After he has thought over and clarified all of these elements, the officer should make a written outline of his plan and schedule of action. This will help him to resolve all problems and accomplish his mission completely and clandestinely in the briefest possible period of time.

 Secure Exit


The departure of a case officer for an agent meeting is critical when he is under legal cover in a capitalist country with stringent counterintelligence practices. Preparations can be made approximately as follows. 

Several days before the scheduled meeting the residency, using support means and other available assets, studies the status of the case officer with respect to the presence of counterintelligence surveillance. Also studied are the counterintelligence personnel and technical assets being used against the Soviet installations, especially the counterintelligence officers assigned to follow the given case officer. Trial exits of the case officer into the city are made in order to determine the nature and extent of surveillance. Similar exits are made simultaneously by other case officers in order to determine as completely as possible the intensity of surveillance and to see whether the counterintelligence assets assigned to the given officer are withdrawn and reassigned to follow the others. 

The case officer who is to hold the meeting "trains" counterintelligence personnel to a habitual daily schedule of movements in order to take the edge off their vigilance. It may be useful to deviate from this daily pattern sometimes in order to test how the counterintelligence personnel react, but one should never "play" with the counterintelligence agents and tease them by acts ostensibly designed to shake surveillance. 

On the basis of data collected by these measures steps are worked out for the officer to make a secure exit into the city to hold the meeting (or to forewarn the agent if he discovers surveillance). A system of signals is agreed upon and an appropriate distribution of security and support personnel is worked out. For the latter, other case officers and technical personnel in the residency are co-opted, ones not subject to intensive counterintelligence surveillance. 

For the exit itself various techniques of camouflage are used. In one case, talks indicating the case officer was ill were held several times during the day over a telephone known to be tapped by the counterintelligence service. The state of his health was being discussed again over the telephone at the very time when he was leaving his home to meet an agent, so early that surveillance teams had not yet started to work. In another instance the officer was hidden in an automobile and driven by two other members of the residency to a place where one of the two was taking driving lessons. The counterintelligence agents, who for some time had been used to watching this car leave for the driving lessons, now trailed it for a while and then fell for the cover story and discontinued surveillance.

 Once a "party" was arranged in the apartment of a case officer who was scheduled to meet with an illegal. Counterintelligence, believing the cover story and supposing that all residency personnel subject to y a d supp sing tha y p el subje surveillance were safely assembled in this one place, relaxed vigilance. Taking advantage of their relaxation, the "host" went out by a secret exit, held his meeting, and returned the same way. He resumed entertaining his "guests" and then conducted them down to the street before the very eyes of the counterintelligence agents, leaving the impression he had been in the apartment with his comrades all the time. 

In order to weaken surveillance over a case officer who is about to leave for an agent meeting, other members of the residency are sometimes sent into town in order to disperse the strength of the surveillance teams and distract their attention. The invention of successful camouflage devices depends on the use of initiative and resourcefulness in the light of the specific concrete situation.

Surveillance en Route


Automobiles and residency members on foot can be used for signaling danger to the case officer going to a meeting. They are stationed at prearranged points, the men perhaps making calls from specified telephone booths. Everything is calculated as to time and place. The case officer may be required to go to a stipulated point at a given time or be at a given place in order to observe what kind of a signal is set up there. If our automobile, for example, were parked at a specified point, this would signify that the case officer was under surveillance and should not keep the rendezvous. In working out such safeguards they should be so calculated as to warn the case officer in time for him to call off the operation before making contact with the agent. 

Secret technical devices are used to detect surveillance on case officers going to an agent meeting.7 Carefully selected residency employees can also be sent out to test operational conditions along the handling officer's route, at particular points to be passed, and in the area of the meeting place. This must be done, however, without attracting superfluous persons into the meeting area and without drawing counterintelligence attention to it. In some cases such procedures are coordinated on the spot with residents of fellow intelligence organs.8 Sometimes employees supporting the meeting of a case officer with an agent are subjected to more intense surveillance than the case officer himself and so pull the counterintelligence "tails" along after them to the meeting. In this fashion security support is converted into its opposite, and the operation has to be called off.  

The case officer departing for a meeting is required to check carefully whether he himself is under surveillance. If he is, he must convince the surveillants by his actions that his trip into town has no intelligence connotations; that is, he must act in conformity with the approved cover story or its alternate. He must also try to shake off the surveillants. It is not proper, however, to let it be evident that he is trying to shake them off, especially if the meeting is with a valuable agent. Obvious efforts usually do not work. On the contrary, they charge the atmosphere around the case officer and bring on counterintelligence reinforcements. The officer can go on to the meeting only after careful checking and making fully certain that there is no surveillance. When surveillance is discovered and when it is impossible to get away from it naturally, he should calmly abort the meeting.

Te Meeting


Upon meeting the agent, the case officer first tells him the cover story for their being together and then establishes arrangements for future contact. After that the business specified in the meeting plan can be taken up. If the plan calls for the return of intelligence materials to the agent, these are given to him immediately. But if it calls for the case officer to get materials from the agent, it is best for him to take them at the last moment, just before the meeting ends. Then, when counterintelligence activity is severe, he must get rid of them as quickly as possible. For this purpose support automobiles or other members of the residency are sometimes stationed at predetermined points in order to take them from him.

 Various techniques are used to effect the transfer of intelligence materials. They can be thrown into the open window of a parked automobile.. They can be passed outside of town between two cars in motion, one overtaking the other and running side by side with it for a brief span. Heavy suitcases containing radio gear, for example, can be handed over in this way. Or the exchange can be accomplished under y ng plish the pretext that one car is helping the other make repairs. Under present conditions, however, residencies under legal cover should receive and pass materials whenever possible via non-personal forms of communication with the aid of technical operational equipment.

After the meeting has ended the case officer may, if special permission has been obtained from the resident, check on the actions of the agent by discreet, unnoticeable surveillance. This practice obtains when something in his behavior and performance gives rise to suspicion. 

Upon return to the residency the case officer makes a detailed oral report to the resident, and if asked he writes a report for transmittal to Headquarters including his own comments and conclusions. The resident adds his comments before sending it


  Under Beter Conditions


Meetings with an agent in a third country are planned and conducted in compliance with all the requirements of cover and clandestinity applicable to agent meetings everywhere. This applies especially when a Headquarters officer has traveled there with Soviet documentation to hold the meeting. In a third country, however, the operational climate is more favorable in that the counterintelligence and police agents do not know the identity of either the case officer or the agent. Moreover, neither the case officer nor the agent has acquaintances among the local populace, with whom an encounter during a meeting would be most undesirable. The agent feels more confident and relaxed, a circumstance which facilitates a more complete and thorough examination and resolution of the business at hand. 

A third country is usually chosen that has less stringent counterintelligence practices, one where the operational situation permits holding a meeting with less risk of discovery. The case officer who arrives in a third country illegally, with foreign documentation, enjoys still more favorable conditions, not only for meetings but also for non-clandestine association with the agent. The two can even live in the same hotel. Nevertheless, a case officer meeting an agent in a third country must carefully adhere to all the rules of clandestine intelligence operations. 

In illegal residencies and agent groups, meetings with agents should conform to the same requirements, even though conditions are different and security measures normally do not have to be carried to such lengths. The establishment of personal contact in illegal residencies and agent groups is under the control of Headquarters, and residents and group leaders report on meetings to Headquarters through their communications channels. 

Meetings with an agent summoned from abroad to Headquarters enjoy the most favorable conditions of all, held in a safehouse and in a calm atmosphere which provide the opportunity to thrash out problems thoroughly and resolve pending operational matters. Such meetings establish conditions for definitive checking and assessment of the agent, should this be necessary. They entail, however, acute problems of security and cover, especially when the agent is quartered in a hotel with other foreigners. His contacts with Soviet officials must not become known to outsiders, especially his own countrymen. if he arrives with false documentation, he should be quartered in a safehouse only, and he should not appear in those places where citizens of his country might meet him. His exit from the USSR also requires serious attention. He cannot take an airplane or train on which acquaintances might happen to be traveling. 

Conclusions  


Despite its obvious vulnerability, personal contact in agent operations is unavoidable. It must be used most intensively for recruitment purposes. It has a number of advantages over other modes of agent communication. It facilitates the exchange of materials, the assessment of potential agents, and agent indoctrination and training. It is a means of direct supervision, which is extraordinarily important and necessary in intelligence operations, especially in the protection of the network from penetration by provocateurs and counterintelligence agents. 

It is used primarily within residencies. It is also used by Headquarters for communication with agents, group leaders, and illegal residents, especially in peacetime. It can seldom be the means of delivering urgent sp cially in p ering urg intelligence reports, however, and therefore even in peacetime arrangements for radio and other forms of non-personal communication with Headquarters must be established.

Much is demanded of case officers making personal contacts -- excellence in operational preparedness, personality, education, and general cultural development, knowledge of specialized matters on which the agents are working, ability to detect surveillance, ability to grasp quickly the content and significance of a discussion and make correct decisions on matters broached by agents, and skill in avoiding compromise of self and agent when danger threatens. 


Because of the complexity of modern operational conditions, the possibilities for personal contact in a target country are significantly reduced and in some instances eliminated completely. Personal contact with a valuable agent should take place in a third country or at Headquarters. 

Under present conditions the number of personal meetings between agents and case officers under legal cover should be reduced to a minimum. This end can be achieved by the amalgamation of agents into agent groups or illegal residencies, by cutting off group leaders and illegal residents from contact with legal residencies, and by training illegal case officers at Headquarters to send out for meetings. The indispensable residue of meetings in residencies under legal cover are feasible if the essential measures of security and cover are taken. 

Because plans for personal contacts depend on the particular participants, purposes, and local situation, much freedom is granted to residents in this respect. Yet control and supervision by Headquarters is never completely absent. It is precisely the central intelligence apparatus which can and must, by study of experience with personal contacts in all strategic intelligence operations, substantially aid residents to set up arrangements that conform with modern operational conditions. Headquarters officers, residency officers, and those who are in intelligence training establishments must develop the highest creative initiative and resourcefulness in the quest for secure agent communications, in fitting these to actual operational problems, and in the application of the latest attainments of Soviet and foreign science and technology.

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