Sunday, 30 October 2022

Psywar in Intelligence Operations

 

U.S. Department of Defense | Research

Intelligence Analysis: Psywar in Intelligence Operations CSI

30 October 2022 Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

Washington, D.C. October 2022

by Dr. E. Sifuentes and Dr. L. Warren | Central Intelligence Agency                           


   




Interlocking aspects of the intelligence and psychological warfare functions. 

Eduardo Sifuentes

The intelligence operator, whether collector or analyst, in any Western nation engaged in a defense effort against the Sino-Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement has at least four major reasons to take an active interest in psychological warfare. First, much of the information he collects or analyzes is of value primarily for psywar purposes. Second, psywar may, and does, influence his operational environment and so affects the availability of information to him. Third, intelligence operations have an intrinsic psywar significance, immediate or latent, intentional or unintentional. Fourth, psywar operations, under the specific condition of cold war with the Sino-Soviet bloc and the world Communist movement, require effective clandestine support, which can be provided best by intelligence personnel knowledgeable in the requirements of covert activity. 


Psywar as Intelligence Customer

The intelligence officer is not inspired by the purpose of merely collecting and evaluating information or making analytic studies. His mission is not an end in itself, but a means to an end -- a contribution to the defense and foreign policy objectives of his country. His work is therefore meaningful only to the extent that the information he provides is utilized through appropriate action. The individual operator's performance, to be sure, does not lose merit if significant information which he acquired in due time and reported to proper sig quir ep o prop authority is not acted upon; but the intelligence organization as a whole has failed to function effectively if the information it produces does not lead to some kind of policy determination or action.

In some fields the relationship of an item of information to a course of action is simple and obvious. Data on a new enemy weapon, for instance, transmitted to the armed services, will enable them to develop a similar innovation, to devise a defense against it, or at least to alert combat; troops to the new hazard it represents. Or intelligence about another country's plans for tactics at a diplomatic conference will enable the collecting country's diplomats to adjust their own preparations accordingly.

Less self-evident are the customer to be informed and the appropriate actions to be taken on some of the widely variegated types of information which can be generally classed as "of psywar value." Traditional political and economic reporting, in addition to its importance for policy agencies, often has relevance to psywar operations; a shift in Soviet production from military hardware to consumer goods interests not only diplomats and military planners but also propagandists. Psywar needs sociological and psychological data which can be obtained by overt research, for example the relative influence of established religion and atheist indoctrination on the populations of Communist countries. Operational data may be of psywar significance, such as the covert Communist control of ostensibly non-Communist mass communications media or Communist influence on political parties and other power factors in the non-Communist world.

 It is not enough that the intelligence operator should recognize the psywar value of his information and transmit it to a customer authorized to act on it. In the field of psychological warfare, as in any other segment of intelligence collection, the customer's requirements determine what is to be collected, the priority assigned it, and whether only information on the national, policymaking level or also particularized data on lower levels is to be sought. These requirements of the customer depend in turn upon his plans and capabilities for action. The relationship between intelligence collector and customer in the psywar field must therefore be a mutual one. Support and guidance must flow both ways.

The Communist intelligence officer has no problem in getting his information acted upon: the Party takes action either through its own organization, usually the Agitprop or Foreign Relations department of its Central Secretariat, or indirectly, through the government intelligence services or the front organizations it controls, on all intelligence of psywar value. The Western nations have no organs with functions even remotely comparable to those of a Communist party, especially one in power; they have to take action on psywar intelligence primarily through a government agency. 


Psywar as Intelligence Aid 

The intelligence operator's chances of success or failure depend not only upon the determination, skill, professional equipment, and other assets that he and his organization bring to bear, but also upon the environment in which he is operating. Some elements of this environment are in a sense objective: he must travel and communicate over certain distances, he must avoid certain controls, he must counter the opposition. Other elements, however, are psychological -- the extent and intensity of friendliness or hostility with which his and the opposition's course are viewed by actual or potential agents, or by any persons in a position to help or hinder their activities; the apparent superiority of one side or the other in the eyes of those in between; morale and loyalty in the opposition's ranks; and so forth.

These psychological elements in the operational climate can be of decisive importance. The operations of Hitler's Gestapo against the outlawed German Communist Party were greatly assisted by the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda in mobilizing the active support of large parts of the population for this work. When the same Gestapo was later sent into France and other Nazi-occupied countries to cope with the Communist underground there, it was far less successful. It must have been largely the change in operational climate, not any deterioration in the professional skill of Hitler's security and intelligence services, which led from the effective liquidation of the German Communist underground to the Nazis' failure to suppress the Communists in the countries their armies had effectively occupied.

15  years ago the West surfaced Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th CPSU Congress and gave the text world-wide publicity. The impact of this revelation of Stalin's crimes upon Communists and non-Communists alike benefited Western intelligence operations in many ways: it induced defections, it lowered morale in Communist ranks, it increased people's readiness to assist the West and thereby markedly improved the operational climate.

Intelligence operators need not wait for windfalls to improve the operational climate upon which so much depends in their work. They can contribute actively to Psywar operations which, either as their main objective or as a byproduct, will modify the operational climate in the desired direction. Intelligence collection and Psywar objectives coincide in this aspect of operations. 


Psywar as Intelligence Product 

Some intelligence operations, especially ones of a tactical and technical ellig e op sp cially on nature, carry, whether incidentally or by main intent, a significant Psywar impact. A psychological purpose is central to deception operations that mislead the opposition by playing false information into its hands or staging ostensible operations against a false target. The incidental psychological effect of other intelligence operations may influence not only the opposition but other groups and populations at large.

 The obvious success of an intelligence operation may impress both friend and foe. At one stage in World War II, Allied aircraft attacked a new underground headquarters of the German Supreme Command within 24 hours after it had been put into service; and years after the war the inhabitants of the area were still discussing with awe the efficiency of Western espionage. It does not matter whether that air attack was really the product of espionage, the result of aerial reconnaissance, or merely a lucky accident: whatever the historic truth, the depth of the psychological impact for a long time after the event was startling.

Although most intelligence operations are carried out with the knowledge of only a very limited number of persons, a large-scale psychological effect is often produced when they are later exposed and publicized by the originating service or by the opposition. The results do not always coincide with the intentions of the side that provides the publicity. Several years ago, for instance, the Soviets in Berlin discovered that a Western service had tapped their communication lines by means of a tunnel dug under the sector border. They decided to give this perfidious trick as much publicity as they could, and they brought busloads of correspondents, domestic and foreign, to the site. The ensuing publicity, however, was for the most part quite different from what they expected: many people in Germany and throughout Western Europe were impressed by the feat and reassured by this evidence that the West was capable of matching wits with the Soviets.

Intelligence officers ought to give careful consideration to the potential of proposed operations for psychological flap or psychological advantage in event of exposure. Further, they should examine the possibilities for intentional psywar use of operations of their own or of the opposition. 

Psywar as Covert Operation 

In the cold war, the United States and her allies find themselves mostly on the defensive, which means, among other things, that their antagonists have the first choice of weapons, battlefields, and timetables. The Communists have chosen primarily political weapons -- agitation and propaganda, mass organizations, subversion. Although they do not eschew the use of more orthodox means in the international arena -- armed forces, economic warfare, diplomacy -- these are subordinated to the political bias of the controlling diploma y -- th e p olling Communist Party.  

The cold war is therefore being fought mainly with the weapons of psychological warfare, taken in its broadest meaning to denote the whole range of manifestations from propaganda and various kinds of national penetration to the political-psychological effects of the respective antagonists' achievement in orthodox activities -- military power, economic strength, social stability, national morale, and so forth. There are other reasons for this hegemony of the psychological, too, among them the reluctance of governments to risk nuclear war in pursuit of their national objectives, the extraordinary new efficiency, range, and speed of mass communications, and the rapid rise of literacy rates in all parts of the world.

On the Communist side, these weapons are wielded mainly by ostensibly nongovernment agencies, the Communist parties and their innumerable fronts and auxiliary organizations. This setup enables a Communist government to disclaim formally the responsibility for whatever these groups may be doing in another country. It also provides a huge, specialized apparatus devoted largely to the conduct of the cold war, endowed with enormous manpower reserves - - the 85 Communist parties alone have more than 30 million card-carrying members, of whom several hundred thousand are full-time activists -- and backed by the massive financial and technical resources of twelve totalitarian dictatorships.

On the Communist side, these weapons are wielded mainly by ostensibly nongovernment agencies, the Communist parties and their innumerable fronts and auxiliary organizations. This setup enables a Communist government to disclaim formally the responsibility for whatever these groups may be doing in another country. It also provides a huge, specialized apparatus devoted largely to the conduct of the cold war, endowed with enormous manpower reserves - - the 85 Communist parties alone have more than 30 million card-carrying members, of whom several hundred thousand are full-time activists -- and backed by the massive financial and technical resources of twelve totalitarian dictatorships.

The mass organizations of the non-Communist world -- political parties, labor unions, veterans' associations, and the like -- though capable of playing a significant role in the cold war, are by themselves no match for the world-wide Communist machine. Most of them exist for some strictly limited purpose such as getting their representatives elected to parliament or obtaining better working conditions for their members; they cannot compete with a movement whose central and pervasive purpose is to bring all mankind under the dictatorship of the proletariat and thus decisively to change the course of history. In countries where the Communist movement is comparatively weak, political groups, however anti-Communist in their basic attitudes, naturally spend a far greater amount of their energies in competing with each other than in fighting the cold war. But even in countries like Italy, France, India, or Japan, where the Communists are strong and well organized, the spontaneous anti-Communist efforts of political parties and other mass organizations are inadequate, being limited to opposing the local Communists at the polls and in shop steward elections and similar contests, without mounting any effective counteroffensive against world Communism beyond their borders.

 These private efforts can make a successful contribution in the cold war only if they are all coordinated, supported, and supplemented by government action. But since the psywar weapon chosen by the Communists involves activities which, when not entirely clandestine, must have their government sponsorship disguised, the regular agencies of a democratic government in peace time (and the cold war, for all that its outcome will be of more decisive significance for mankind than that of a good many shooting wars in earlier phases of history, is technically considered a state of peace) would find it difficult to meet the Communist drive on the scale and with the militancy required.

The conduct of the West's psywar effort is therefore inextricably bound up with the intelligence function. This phase of national defense has to be carried out by clandestine means not attributable to the sponsoring government. It has to depend on intelligence techniques such as cover, foreign agents, the penetration of hostile organizations, and third-country operations, as well as utilize information obtained by clandestine collection. Organizationally, however, responsibility for psywar may be assigned in any of three ways--to the same organization and the same personnel that collect intelligence; to the same organization which collects intelligence but to separate units and different personnel; or to an independent organization, connected only through liaison arrangements with the collecting service.

The decision as to which of these three ways should be chosen in a given country and at a given time has to be made at top level and will be governed by a variety of considerations. Regardless which organizational form is selected for psywar, however, the intimate relationships with intelligence outlined above will remain. We are faced with three alternatives in the cold war -- to surrender peacefully ("better red than dead," as the pacifists say); to leave the decision to World War III; or to fight world Communism at least to a standstill, forcing it by means short of general war, i.e., by successful psychological warfare, to abandon its world drive. Taking cognizance that this is the choice, everyone in the intelligence community, whatever his specific function, ought to give psywar operations his unstinting support.  


Sunday, 9 October 2022

Intelligence protocols for Operational Contacts



Center for the Study of Intelligence | Research

Intelligence Research: Intelligence protocols for Operational Contacts 

10 October 2022 Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

Washington, D.C. October 2022

by Dr. E. Sifuentes | Intelligence Agency 


Intelligence research on the holding of meetings with agents.
 
E. S. Sifuentes l Code Name: CZ1oo3 

Personal contacts with agents are conditioned by a series of mutually related factors among which the following are basic: 

  • The situation, maturity, and importance of the agent. 
  • What is to be accomplished by the meeting. 
  • The professional skill and the legal status of case officer and agent. 
  • The timing, duration, and place of the meeting. Prevailing operational conditions. 


Qualit of the Agent


If an agent is sufficiently trusted and if he supplies valuable information, personal contact with him should be reduced to a minimum. For the intervals it suffices to work out a plan for either to summon the other to a meeting in case of emergency. 

Even in meetings with a tested and reliable agent much attention is paid to security as well as to the fulfillment of intelligence requirements; but in working with an agent who has not been fully assessed and vetted, the prime emphasis is put on vigilance and checking-has he been planted by the local counterintelligence, are his motives in agreeing to collaborate sincere? The need for personal meetings with such an agent is increased, for they give the opportunity to assess him more completely. But the meetings must be conducted with caution. In 2022 an officer assigned to a certain residency 2 submitted a plan for a thirdcountry meeting with an agent who had been recently and hurriedly recruited and not thoroughly assessed. Headquarters warned the resident 3 of the need for precautionary measures, and in this it proved to be correct: the agent brought along counterintelligence officers to the meeting site. The resident's application of precautionary measures and the case officer's observance of correct operating techniques en route to the meeting made possible the deflection of a serious provocation by adversary counterintelligence. One should not neglect personal meetings with agents who are not sources of important information. Agents performing support roles are also essential to the service and should be appreciated. If a Soviet intelligence officer on an illegal assignment is supplied cover by an auxiliary agent, his fate depends upon that agent.

In general, whatever an agent's role in the intelligence net, personal contact should be made with him only when it is impossible to manage without it. The number of meetings should be kept as low as possible, especially with sources of valuable information. This principle holds for all residencies and agent group but particularly for residencies under legal cover in countries which have severe counterintelligence practices. 

Purpose of Meetings


Personal meetings may be held to give an agent his next assignment and instructions for carrying it out, to train him in tradecraft or the use of technical or communications equipment, to transmit documents, reports, technical equipment, money, or other items, or to fulfill several of these purposes. In actual practice several purposes are usually served by a meeting. In addition to its particular objectives more general needs can be filled. A meeting held for training purposes may be a means for clarifying biographic data on the agent or his views on various subjects. At every meeting with an agent one should study him and obtain new data on his potential and talents, thereby providing a better basis for judging his sincerity and deciding how much trust to place in him.

These various objectives require different kinds of meeting in terms of frequency, duration, and choice of time and place.

 Professional Skill


Success in face-to-face handling depends to a large degree on the professional authority of the handler, his knowledge of the business, the firmness of his will, his adherence to principle, and his ability to get along with people. Above all else is dedication to the assignment and a positive resolve to achieve success and fulfill the assigned tasks.

Vigilance in protecting one's activity and intentions not only from counterintelligence but also from the agent requires a developed intuition, the power of observation, and an ability to retain the initiative and assert one's will tactfully. 

  Some case officers lose the initiative during agent meetings by wasting time discussing secondary matters or problems in no way related to the purpose of the meeting and end up failing to attain the objectives for which the meeting had been set up. Recently, for example, a case officer from one of our residencies under legal cover was asked to make a quick contact with an agent in order to transmit to him Headquarters' decision that he should immediately leave the country because of impending danger. Instead of executing these instructions immediately, the case officer devoted a meeting to completely unnecessary conversation about the agent's status in the country, means of communication, legal documentation, etc. Then he ordered the agent not to travel anywhere without his approval and set another meeting for six days later! The resident had to correct the situation immediately.

There have been cases in which agents have actually refused to meet with officers who exhibited incompetence in matters concerning which they themselves, as specialists, were working in behalf of Soviet intelligence. During meetings the case officers acted timid, were not serious, let their minds wander, acted stiff and formal, attempted to order the agents about, or did not show interest in the agents' problems. Or they did not give the agents satisfactory explanations of operational or contact problems, betraying thereby lack of preparation and at times confusion, which engendered doubts in the agents as to the security of working with them. Such conduct has often lost us the services of valuable agents.

 Experienced case officers are made; not born. Experience is acquired by practical work. New case officers, just beginning to work at agent operations abroad, therefore have to hold personal meetings with agents. But they learn also by example, instruction, and coaching. It is necessary to imbue them with professional skills and draw them gradually, starting with less complicated tasks, into the work of handling agents.

Legal Status


There have been instances in which agents have refused to meet with case officers whose legal position in the country was incompatible with their own situation. In particular, several agents have refused to have meetings with officers from our military attaché apparatus because if discovered by outsiders or counterintelligence they would be incriminated. The legal status of case officers and agents is of utmost significance for clandestinity, security of communications, and ability to make personal contact and must be taken into account in planning meetings.

 During the years 2019-2021 our service training suffered some bitter failures. To a significant degree these were a consequence of slackened vigilance on the part of case officers in legal residencies and of their agents. The case officers would report that meetings had been carried out under favorable conditions and there had been no external surveillance. But testimony at trials would subsequently show that counterintelligence had known not only the time and place of meetings but also their duration and details such as who the participants were and what they did, how the officers were dressed, and in one case even the color of the wrapper on a package that had been passed. There had obviously been surveillance which both case officers and agents had failed to detect. These failures occurred, not because operational conditions were terribly complicated or the adversary counterintelligence service was so skillful, but because either the case officers or the agents had forgotten to be vigilant at all times, mistaken the significance of cover and security, or done incorrect things. This was what enabled counterintelligence to arrest our agents and expel our officers from the country. At present counterintelligence practices are less severe in several of the eastern capitalist countries than in the west, but that gives no reason to weaken vigilance there. Favorable elements in any operational situation should be taken advantage of, but not by relaxing vigilance and security consciousness.

Illegal residencies and agent groups, not being subject to surveillance of the kind experienced under legal cover, can depend better on having secure personal meetings. These can be held in a relaxed atmosphere and in some instances without clandestinity. In every country there live many "welcome" foreigners, tourism is a mass phenomenon, business and family ties are widely developed; thus large human streams cross international borders. No country has a counterintelligence service with the capability to follow every foreigner, not to say every local inhabitant, in its effort to identify officers and agents of foreign intelligence services. 

This does not mean that members of illegal residencies are not subjected to any surveillance, only that its incidence on them is greatly reduced. Provided, of course, that they have not compromised themselves by mistakes or rash acts and so been placed under special observation, counterintelligence does not follow at their heels. Moreover, they have greater freedom in selecting cover stories, means of disguise, and other security measures, even in countries with the most severe counterintelligence practices.  
 

Choice of Case Ofcer


  The legal status factor should be taken into account in deciding what case officer is to be assigned to carry out any particular meeting with an agent. Initially, in legal residencies, meetings with agents are carried out by the officers who assessed and recruited them. Depending on the y th ep ding on th purpose of the meeting or the importance of the agent, they can also be held by the resident, his deputy, or a special case officer sent for this purpose from Headquarters.

Case officers in legal residencies, in the course of recruiting agents, cultivate new contacts among local inhabitants who seem to have agent potential. The development of such persons, on top of already recruited agents, brings an increasing number of personal meetings and concomitant danger of detection. In order to reduce this danger and also improve the management of the intelligence net, Headquarters splits off the most valuable agents of legal residencies and sets them up under illegal residencies or as agent groups reporting directly to Headquarters via illegal channels. 

In illegal residencies and agent groups meetings are held by the residents, their deputies, and the group leaders. A resident can assign a trusted cut-out to hold a meeting that has limited objectives such as transmitting materials. Despite the favorable conditions in illegal residencies, meetings must be planned and held in full compliance with clandestine operational doctrine. Holding them without professional planning is not permitted. Each member of an illegal residency or agent group must check constantly for clandestinity and for the security of his illegal status and make efforts to improve that status.

In principle it is undesirable to make frequent changes in the person assigned to meet an agent. It is therefore important, before assigning an officer to make contact with any agent, to think over thoroughly all the considerations presented above in order to avoid mistakes. From the point of view of security, it is also improper to set up personal contact between the radio operator of an illegal residency and agents in its network. Only the resident must know the identity of the radio operator. 

As a parallel security measure the agents of an illegal residency must not know the basic biographic data (name, nationality, addresses) on the resident, his assistants, or the cut-outs who effect the operational contact. For this reason it is better to use pseudonyms, although in practice it is not always possible. Under no circumstances should horizontal lines of personal contact be permitted, even if adherence to this doctrine necessitates excluding an agent from operational activity for some time. This is a vitally important rule, especially among valuable and trusted agents. Headquarters is responsible for personal contact arrangements with illegal residents, group leaders, and singleton case officers or agents reporting directly to Headquarters. It sends out its case officers for this purpose, either illegally with foreign documentation or officially with Soviet documentation and an appropriate cover story. The meetings can be held in the target country or in a third country. In some cases the agent may be summoned to Headquarters and the business taken care of there. In that case it is necessary to expunge from the agent's passport (or the resident's or group leader's), all notations concerning his stay in the Soviet Union.

Choice of Place  


The choice of meeting place is of considerable importance and should be made deliberately and with foresight. It has to lend itself to the objectives of the meeting, suit the positions in society of the agent and case officer, and satisfy security considerations. Meetings can be held on city streets, in parks, restaurants, cafes, reading rooms, or museums, out of town, in the suburbs, etc. The range of possibilities depends to a large degree on the creative initiative of members of the residency, conditioned by a firm knowledge of the real operational situation, local conditions, and the structure and techniques of the counterintelligence and police forces. 

Elements to be taken into account include the severity of the country's administration, the sensitivity of the police force, the extent to which police and counterintelligence check local inhabitants, foreigners, employees of Soviet installations, main highways, streets, and squares, and how well state and private buildings and transportation facilities are guarded. Similarly it is necessary to bear in mind the degree to which counterintelligence and police agents are planted in enterprises and public buildings such as theaters, museums, libraries, and restaurants. In addition to counterintelligence activity, one should consider police measures for maintaining public order, particularly the control of criminal elements and lesser violators of law and morality. In the summer of 1959, for example, two of our illegals meeting abroad found themselves in a district where the police were conducting a roundup of such elements. When they saw what was going on they took off, but could not get away y sa as going on th y t t g y without having their documents inspected by the police. The situation would have been much worse for an officer under legal cover meeting with an agent.

For prolonged meetings it is necessary to choose places which outsiders cannot observe. Frequently the agent is picked up at some predetermined place in an automobile and taken for operational work to a place chosen earlier that the agent himself had not known about. The agent's own car can also be used for this purpose. It is best not to hold conversations on operational matters in the automobile, for it is possible that a recorder might be hidden in it.

 Places for long meetings present fewer difficulties in illegal residencies. Their members can meet in their own apartments, in hotels, or in out-oftown resort areas without any special risk of suspicion. But even in illegal residencies the demands of clandestinity and security must be observed in choosing meeting places. The local operational climate and the status of the persons to take part in the meeting must be taken into account

The problem is greater in residencies under legal cover, Here it is best either to have reliable safehouses or to deliver the agent discreetly to the official residency building. The latter is a serious operational move. If neither is feasible, it is better to have Headquarters dispatch an officer to a third country, either legally or illegally, for the meeting. 

Here are some of the mistakes sometimes made by case officers of legal residencies. They hold meetings in restaurants and other public establishments located near hotels and houses where employees of Soviet installations, sometimes even the case officers themselves, reside. The service personnel in such establishments know the identities of Soviet citizens. Some of them may be counterintelligence agents, and in any case they may spot our officer holding a meeting and report to the police or the counterintelligence service. Other meetings are held near guarded compounds and government installations where more intense surveillance is maintained than elsewhere. Some case officers use the same site for successive meetings over an extended period of time. Others hold meetings in their own or the agent's apartment, sometimes taking along their wives in order to sugest a family friendship. These fail to realize that social intercourse implies a closer relationship than legitimate business relations and unquestionably will not escape notice in these days of intense counterintelligence activity.

Timing, Duration, Frequency


  In the matter of timing it is always necessary to bear in mind the current foreign policy objectives of the Soviet government so that these will not be prejudiced by any unfavorable incident arising from the operational contact. If there is any such risk the meeting should be postponed until another time. This applies to meetings with agents that are poorly assessed or insufficiently tested, particularly if there is doubt of their bona fides. It applies also when there is a possibility that the case officer will be under surveillance as he leaves for the meeting. This consideration should be borne in mind by case officers of illegal residencies but especially by those in residencies under legal cover. 

Governments of capitalist countries sometimes pursue political ends by having counterintelligence set up special provocations against Soviet officials and catch them meeting with agents or agent candidates. The object may be to compromise Soviet foreign policy, strain international relations, or strengthen the political position of the capitalist government, especially if it is currently trying to get a military or antidemocratic law through parliament. Sometimes this is done against the opposition of the counterintelligence service, for the premature detention of the Soviet officer may frustrate its effort to make a thorough study of his contacts. As a rule provocations against our officers are associated with an international or internal political development, and they are even mounted against officials who have no connection with agent operations.

Meetings should be kept as short as the transaction of the business allows. The case officer and agent must not be together without a purpose. They should not waste time discussing matters having no substantial relationship to the business at hand. This does not mean that one should talk to the agent only about business in dry bureaucratic language. Sensitivity towards the agent's interests must be developed. If the situation permits, he should be heard out even on matters which were not anticipated when the meeting was planned but which have an operational relationship and can influence his future work. But he should not be permitted to deflect the talk into a labyrinth of secondary, insignificant topics. The case officer must keep the initiative in his own hands, and he must remember that control of a meeting in a proper and businesslike manner cuts down its length.

 Frequent meetings with the same agent are unwise, especially if he is a tested and reliable one producing important secret information. Meetings with such agents can be reduced to one or two a year, or even fewer, held whenever possible in third countries. Routine transactions can be taken care of through nonpersonal forms of communication. With more ordinary agents it should not be necessary to meet oftener than once every two or three months. These limitations are of special importance for residencies under legal cover.

operational conditions


  It should be taken as axiomatic that Soviet intelligence officers under legal cover are subject to counterintelligence scrutiny in all capitalist countries, most effectively in those with severe counterintelligence practices. In some European and eastern countries the counterintelligence effort is not as intense as in the countries of the Anglo-American bloc, and the operational situation is therefore "easier." But this seeming ease never justifies reduced vigilance and securityconsciousness on the part of case officers and agents. Flaps still occur in countries where the operational situation appears to be relatively favorable, and analysis shows that flaps do not depend on the complexity or simplicity of the operational situation but are traceable to deficiencies in the camouflage of operational activity, slackening of vigilance, and neglect of cover and clandestinity. In capitalist countries of the east that have comparatively small counterintelligence apparatuses, the activities of our legal residencies still do not necessarily go without observation. The counterintelligence programs of such countries as the U.S.A., England, and France are also extended to those eastern countries and seek to undermine and compromise the favorably developing relations between them and the Soviet Union. 

The capitalist counterintelligence services exploit in this effort all the national peculiarities of which the east has many. This tactic of adversary counterintelligence carries possibilities of great unpleasantness for us. Because of the operational conditions now prevailing in capitalist countries, intelligence officers, especially those in residencies under legal cover, must seek out and apply the most reliable forms and methods of camouflage and clandestinity when meeting personally with agents. Although the holding of personal meetings has been rendered difficult for them, with proper study, good planning, and careful execution it can be successful. Counterintelligence surveillance of personnel in Soviet installations abroad is not so tight or continuous as to make operational activity impossible. As a rule it is intermittent and is shifted from one case officer to another and even to persons that have no connection with agent operations. A counterintelligence service does not possess the means for uninterrupted surveillance in all places at all times in all cities; it uses various systems, and observation teams do not work around the clock in all places. Once one understands the working patterns of a particular counterintelligence service, obstacles erected by it can be circumvented.

An agent with whom personal contact is maintained must be inculcated by his case officer with the qualities of a clandestine personality. He must be invested with the ability to camouflage himself, to exercise vigilance, to determine whether he is being observed by counterintelligence. He must have the ability to spot surveillance at his place of work or outside his place of work, especially when departing for an operational meeting. Agents' carelessness or inexperience in matters of security has often resulted in operational flaps. Some agents have failed to attach significance to the circumstance that someone, often an acquaintance or friend, began to show intensified interest in them before the compromise. They ignored changes in their relationships with coworkers and friends. They did not wonder about the appearance of new faces in their milieu. Some agents, because of inexperience or in a deliberate violation of security rules induced by personal rashness, have failed to check for surveillance when going to an operational meeting. 

Some agents go to operational meetings unprepared, without thinking out their future actions in advance, and have not planned what behavior patterns to exhibit while en route to the meeting place or in its area. Some have approached our case officers at places not stipulated as meeting sites, have telephoned the case officer at his office and discussed personal contact arrangements, or have showed up in person at the Soviet installation to see the case officer. Regardless of how skillful and vigilant a case officer may be, he can come to the attention of counterintelligence if one of his agents violates operational rules deliberately or neglects them because of inexperience. Furthermore, the agent's attitude toward cover and clandestinity when meeting with his case officer contributes to some degree to the over-all assessment of his sincerity and honesty in collaborating with Soviet intelligence. Some agents, of course, work honestly with us without adhering to the basic rules of security on the premise that no kind of surveillance is being directed at them. Nevertheless the case officer must always consider the agent's attitude toward security and train and indoctrinate him accordingly. He must seek out the reasons for every deviation by the agent from the norms of behavior he has laid down.

Planning a Meeting


  The preparation of a meeting plan is done by the handling case officer with the guidance of the resident or his deputy. It begins with the meeting's objectives and tasks, including specific problems to be resolved with the agent, the ways and order of their solution, and operational or personal problems which the agent may have and which should be settled at the meeting. If the meeting place and time previously selected are not suitable for the accomplishment of these tasks or for current operational conditions, then it is proper to make changes. The agent should be informed in advance by non-personal contact or at the agreed time and place during a brief contact. The latter procedure is the better if the scheduled meeting is imminent; it avoids confusion and possible broken contact. If it is possible that surveillance of the handling officer may endanger the meeting, then he can be replaced by another handler. 

The case officer must study the operational climate on the route of travel and in the area of the meeting place. He must be prepared to take correct stock of the situation on the spot and in case of necessity make the proper security decisions. Some case officers panic when complications arise in the operational situation in the vicinity of the meeting place. Some officers suspecting surveillance either continue according to plan, attaching no significance to their suspicions, or completely abandon the meeting without activating planned measures ple ely ab ting with ting pla to get to the bottom of the situation. If the latter, they frequently head for the automobile that brought them to the meeting area instead of going home, thus giving counterintelligence the opportunity to identify another intelligence officer, the one at the wheel of the parked automobile. Another mistake is for the case officer, instead of leaving the meeting area by a route designed to avoid encountering the agent, to take a direction that results in confrontation with him. Not suspecting danger (incidentally, the need for danger signals is not always anticipated), the agent goes right up to the case officer; and counterintelligence has caught them in contact.

The plan will include reaffirmation or replacement of agreed meeting arrangements and signals, the cover story for the meeting and the sequence of actions to be taken to substantiate it, assessment of the personal qualities of the agent and observation of his behavior, the sequence of actions to be used in checking the operational climate in the meeting area beforehand and afterward, and in case of need a check on the agent's honesty. It will include the sequence of moves to be made in the event the agent does not appear or if complications arise while the case officer is en route to the meeting area, approaching the meeting site, or actually with the agent. Finally, it will include arrangements with the support elements assigned to provide security for the meeting and the danger signals agreed upon.

 After he has thought over and clarified all of these elements, the officer should make a written outline of his plan and schedule of action. This will help him to resolve all problems and accomplish his mission completely and clandestinely in the briefest possible period of time.

 Secure Exit


The departure of a case officer for an agent meeting is critical when he is under legal cover in a capitalist country with stringent counterintelligence practices. Preparations can be made approximately as follows. 

Several days before the scheduled meeting the residency, using support means and other available assets, studies the status of the case officer with respect to the presence of counterintelligence surveillance. Also studied are the counterintelligence personnel and technical assets being used against the Soviet installations, especially the counterintelligence officers assigned to follow the given case officer. Trial exits of the case officer into the city are made in order to determine the nature and extent of surveillance. Similar exits are made simultaneously by other case officers in order to determine as completely as possible the intensity of surveillance and to see whether the counterintelligence assets assigned to the given officer are withdrawn and reassigned to follow the others. 

The case officer who is to hold the meeting "trains" counterintelligence personnel to a habitual daily schedule of movements in order to take the edge off their vigilance. It may be useful to deviate from this daily pattern sometimes in order to test how the counterintelligence personnel react, but one should never "play" with the counterintelligence agents and tease them by acts ostensibly designed to shake surveillance. 

On the basis of data collected by these measures steps are worked out for the officer to make a secure exit into the city to hold the meeting (or to forewarn the agent if he discovers surveillance). A system of signals is agreed upon and an appropriate distribution of security and support personnel is worked out. For the latter, other case officers and technical personnel in the residency are co-opted, ones not subject to intensive counterintelligence surveillance. 

For the exit itself various techniques of camouflage are used. In one case, talks indicating the case officer was ill were held several times during the day over a telephone known to be tapped by the counterintelligence service. The state of his health was being discussed again over the telephone at the very time when he was leaving his home to meet an agent, so early that surveillance teams had not yet started to work. In another instance the officer was hidden in an automobile and driven by two other members of the residency to a place where one of the two was taking driving lessons. The counterintelligence agents, who for some time had been used to watching this car leave for the driving lessons, now trailed it for a while and then fell for the cover story and discontinued surveillance.

 Once a "party" was arranged in the apartment of a case officer who was scheduled to meet with an illegal. Counterintelligence, believing the cover story and supposing that all residency personnel subject to y a d supp sing tha y p el subje surveillance were safely assembled in this one place, relaxed vigilance. Taking advantage of their relaxation, the "host" went out by a secret exit, held his meeting, and returned the same way. He resumed entertaining his "guests" and then conducted them down to the street before the very eyes of the counterintelligence agents, leaving the impression he had been in the apartment with his comrades all the time. 

In order to weaken surveillance over a case officer who is about to leave for an agent meeting, other members of the residency are sometimes sent into town in order to disperse the strength of the surveillance teams and distract their attention. The invention of successful camouflage devices depends on the use of initiative and resourcefulness in the light of the specific concrete situation.

Surveillance en Route


Automobiles and residency members on foot can be used for signaling danger to the case officer going to a meeting. They are stationed at prearranged points, the men perhaps making calls from specified telephone booths. Everything is calculated as to time and place. The case officer may be required to go to a stipulated point at a given time or be at a given place in order to observe what kind of a signal is set up there. If our automobile, for example, were parked at a specified point, this would signify that the case officer was under surveillance and should not keep the rendezvous. In working out such safeguards they should be so calculated as to warn the case officer in time for him to call off the operation before making contact with the agent. 

Secret technical devices are used to detect surveillance on case officers going to an agent meeting.7 Carefully selected residency employees can also be sent out to test operational conditions along the handling officer's route, at particular points to be passed, and in the area of the meeting place. This must be done, however, without attracting superfluous persons into the meeting area and without drawing counterintelligence attention to it. In some cases such procedures are coordinated on the spot with residents of fellow intelligence organs.8 Sometimes employees supporting the meeting of a case officer with an agent are subjected to more intense surveillance than the case officer himself and so pull the counterintelligence "tails" along after them to the meeting. In this fashion security support is converted into its opposite, and the operation has to be called off.  

The case officer departing for a meeting is required to check carefully whether he himself is under surveillance. If he is, he must convince the surveillants by his actions that his trip into town has no intelligence connotations; that is, he must act in conformity with the approved cover story or its alternate. He must also try to shake off the surveillants. It is not proper, however, to let it be evident that he is trying to shake them off, especially if the meeting is with a valuable agent. Obvious efforts usually do not work. On the contrary, they charge the atmosphere around the case officer and bring on counterintelligence reinforcements. The officer can go on to the meeting only after careful checking and making fully certain that there is no surveillance. When surveillance is discovered and when it is impossible to get away from it naturally, he should calmly abort the meeting.

Te Meeting


Upon meeting the agent, the case officer first tells him the cover story for their being together and then establishes arrangements for future contact. After that the business specified in the meeting plan can be taken up. If the plan calls for the return of intelligence materials to the agent, these are given to him immediately. But if it calls for the case officer to get materials from the agent, it is best for him to take them at the last moment, just before the meeting ends. Then, when counterintelligence activity is severe, he must get rid of them as quickly as possible. For this purpose support automobiles or other members of the residency are sometimes stationed at predetermined points in order to take them from him.

 Various techniques are used to effect the transfer of intelligence materials. They can be thrown into the open window of a parked automobile.. They can be passed outside of town between two cars in motion, one overtaking the other and running side by side with it for a brief span. Heavy suitcases containing radio gear, for example, can be handed over in this way. Or the exchange can be accomplished under y ng plish the pretext that one car is helping the other make repairs. Under present conditions, however, residencies under legal cover should receive and pass materials whenever possible via non-personal forms of communication with the aid of technical operational equipment.

After the meeting has ended the case officer may, if special permission has been obtained from the resident, check on the actions of the agent by discreet, unnoticeable surveillance. This practice obtains when something in his behavior and performance gives rise to suspicion. 

Upon return to the residency the case officer makes a detailed oral report to the resident, and if asked he writes a report for transmittal to Headquarters including his own comments and conclusions. The resident adds his comments before sending it


  Under Beter Conditions


Meetings with an agent in a third country are planned and conducted in compliance with all the requirements of cover and clandestinity applicable to agent meetings everywhere. This applies especially when a Headquarters officer has traveled there with Soviet documentation to hold the meeting. In a third country, however, the operational climate is more favorable in that the counterintelligence and police agents do not know the identity of either the case officer or the agent. Moreover, neither the case officer nor the agent has acquaintances among the local populace, with whom an encounter during a meeting would be most undesirable. The agent feels more confident and relaxed, a circumstance which facilitates a more complete and thorough examination and resolution of the business at hand. 

A third country is usually chosen that has less stringent counterintelligence practices, one where the operational situation permits holding a meeting with less risk of discovery. The case officer who arrives in a third country illegally, with foreign documentation, enjoys still more favorable conditions, not only for meetings but also for non-clandestine association with the agent. The two can even live in the same hotel. Nevertheless, a case officer meeting an agent in a third country must carefully adhere to all the rules of clandestine intelligence operations. 

In illegal residencies and agent groups, meetings with agents should conform to the same requirements, even though conditions are different and security measures normally do not have to be carried to such lengths. The establishment of personal contact in illegal residencies and agent groups is under the control of Headquarters, and residents and group leaders report on meetings to Headquarters through their communications channels. 

Meetings with an agent summoned from abroad to Headquarters enjoy the most favorable conditions of all, held in a safehouse and in a calm atmosphere which provide the opportunity to thrash out problems thoroughly and resolve pending operational matters. Such meetings establish conditions for definitive checking and assessment of the agent, should this be necessary. They entail, however, acute problems of security and cover, especially when the agent is quartered in a hotel with other foreigners. His contacts with Soviet officials must not become known to outsiders, especially his own countrymen. if he arrives with false documentation, he should be quartered in a safehouse only, and he should not appear in those places where citizens of his country might meet him. His exit from the USSR also requires serious attention. He cannot take an airplane or train on which acquaintances might happen to be traveling. 

Conclusions  


Despite its obvious vulnerability, personal contact in agent operations is unavoidable. It must be used most intensively for recruitment purposes. It has a number of advantages over other modes of agent communication. It facilitates the exchange of materials, the assessment of potential agents, and agent indoctrination and training. It is a means of direct supervision, which is extraordinarily important and necessary in intelligence operations, especially in the protection of the network from penetration by provocateurs and counterintelligence agents. 

It is used primarily within residencies. It is also used by Headquarters for communication with agents, group leaders, and illegal residents, especially in peacetime. It can seldom be the means of delivering urgent sp cially in p ering urg intelligence reports, however, and therefore even in peacetime arrangements for radio and other forms of non-personal communication with Headquarters must be established.

Much is demanded of case officers making personal contacts -- excellence in operational preparedness, personality, education, and general cultural development, knowledge of specialized matters on which the agents are working, ability to detect surveillance, ability to grasp quickly the content and significance of a discussion and make correct decisions on matters broached by agents, and skill in avoiding compromise of self and agent when danger threatens. 


Because of the complexity of modern operational conditions, the possibilities for personal contact in a target country are significantly reduced and in some instances eliminated completely. Personal contact with a valuable agent should take place in a third country or at Headquarters. 

Under present conditions the number of personal meetings between agents and case officers under legal cover should be reduced to a minimum. This end can be achieved by the amalgamation of agents into agent groups or illegal residencies, by cutting off group leaders and illegal residents from contact with legal residencies, and by training illegal case officers at Headquarters to send out for meetings. The indispensable residue of meetings in residencies under legal cover are feasible if the essential measures of security and cover are taken. 

Because plans for personal contacts depend on the particular participants, purposes, and local situation, much freedom is granted to residents in this respect. Yet control and supervision by Headquarters is never completely absent. It is precisely the central intelligence apparatus which can and must, by study of experience with personal contacts in all strategic intelligence operations, substantially aid residents to set up arrangements that conform with modern operational conditions. Headquarters officers, residency officers, and those who are in intelligence training establishments must develop the highest creative initiative and resourcefulness in the quest for secure agent communications, in fitting these to actual operational problems, and in the application of the latest attainments of Soviet and foreign science and technology.

Saturday, 8 October 2022

Intelligence as Foundation for Policy

Center for the Study of Intelligence | Report

Intelligence Analysis: Intelligence as Foundation for Policy 

08 October 2022 Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

Washington, D.C. October 2022

by Dr. E. Sifuentes and Dr. L. Warren | Intelligence Agency

                                 

An integral and in fact basic element in the formation of national security policy is the latest and best intelligence bearing on the substance of the policy to be determined. That statement is not a theoretical truism, but a description of what has by and large actually been practiced in the Executive Branch. It is based on first-hand observation: for periods totaling almost four years I was in continuous touch with the procedures for formulating, adopting, and coordinating the execution of national security policies within the Executive Branch.

NSC Operating Procedures 

The function of the National Security Council, as defined by National Security Act, is "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security, so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of Government to cooperate more effectively in matters affecting the national security." The Act also gives to the Council the duty of "assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power." The Council advises the President both on policy and on plans for its execution, but its primary statutory function thus lies in the formation of policy. The role of the Council as a planning body is subordinate to its policy function. The Council and its subsidiary Planning Board2 and Operations Coordinating Board 3 constitute an apparatus available to the President to help him reach policy decisions on national security. The National Security Act is sufficiently flexible to allow each President to use this personal aid as best suits his convenience. One President may use the Council mechanism in one way, another in another. The best use is made of it when a President uses it in a way that satisfies his personal requirements. It has never been felt necessary to test whether the Congress can constitutionally require by statute that a President consult with specified persons or follow specified procedures in coming to a policy decision in this field. Under President Eisenhower, the normal procedure for operating the policy-making aspects of the NSC mechanism has involved three main steps. First, the NSC Planning Board formulates recommendations as to national security policy and circulates them to Council members and advisers well in advance of the Council meeting at which they are scheduled to be considered. Then the Council considers and approves or modifies or rejects these recommendations, and submits to the President such as it approves or modifies. Finally, the President approves, modifies, or rejects the Council's recommendations, transmits those policies which he approves to the departments and agencies responsible for planning their execution, and - as a rule where international affairs are concerned - requests the NSC Operations Coordinating Board to assist these departments and agencies in coordinating their respective planning for action under the approved policies. Thus a policy is first determined by the President, and then the departments and agencies plan how to carry out their responsibilities to the President under it, being assisted in the coordination of this planning by the OCB. It is, of course, fundamental that the planning to execute policy responsibilities be carried out by the respective departments and agencies which are directly charged by the President with such responsibilities. No person or body should intervene, at a lower level, between the President and the department head directly e dep tly responsible to him. During the period 1953-1958, with which I am familiar, the great bulk of national security policy determinations were made by the President through the operations of the NSC mechanism just described. Because this method of policy formulation was the usual one, such policies were commonly but erroneously referred to as "NSC policies." Since it is the function of the President to determine policy in all areas under his executive control and responsibility, and national security policy may be formed in any way which he finds convenient and appropriate, the policies so formed, whatever body or individual may submit the recommendations therefor, are the President's policies. There were occasions during this period when national security policy was determined by the President as a result of Cabinet deliberations (though this was a rare occurrence) or by his executive decision based on conferences with one or more of his principal department or agency heads, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or others within whose special competence some particular subject would naturally fall. There should always be complete flexibility for every President to determine however he elects the matters of high policy which it is his responsibility to decide. Because of the utility and convenience of the NSC mechanism, however, and because the present Chief Executive values the advantages of integrated recommendations and joint deliberations based on them, it has been the more or less standard operating procedure during his tenure to seek to form national security policies through the procedures outlined above. 

Factual Intelligence and Estimates 

In this article the term "intelligence" is used to embrace both factual intelligence and estimates based thereon. In forming national security policy both are of prime importance. The gathering of intelligence facts is today a matter of enormous scope and hardly conceivable complexity, bearing no resemblance to the simple if hazardous personal mission of a Mata Hari. There are, indeed, many individuals working in the field of intelligence, in and out of formal government service, who must exhibit personal bravery and rare ingenuity, taking risks beyond the ordinary call of duty. Because all is grist that comes to the intelligence mill, one need not seek to measure the results of these individual efforts against the results of the worldwide scientific and technological operations employed in modern intelligence gathering. In our continuing confrontation by a power openly dedicated to swallowing all mankind in the maw of Communism, the rapid gathering of germane intelligence on the activities of other nations in every field of endeavor has put the United States into an electronic business that is world-wide, highly scientific, incredibly complicated, and extremely expensive. It is stagering to realize the limitless ramifications of current technological procedures, the almost overwhelming amount of raw material that comes flooding in every hour of the day and night to be sifted, analyzed, codified, and-most urgent of all-communicated clearly to the decision-makers. For in the last analysis the valid use of intelligence is to build intellectual platforms upon which decisions can be made. It is not gathered to be stored away like a harvest. It must be delivered, succinct and unequivocal, within the shortest time feasible to focal points for use. This prompt delivery is essential both to those who conduct our foreign affairs or direct our defensive military mechanisms and to those who frame our decisions of high policy. The sound concept that the national intelligence effort should be centralized is not inconsistent with a demonstrable need that each of the several departments have its own intelligence arm. The man who may have to dispatch a SAC bomber, an ICBM, a Polaris submarine, or a Pentomic task force has a dual function with regard to intelligence: he has a part in acquiring the latest intelligence for use at central headquarters, all the way up to the President; he also must himself have and use the latest intelligence in carrying out his crucial responsibilities. It is for these reasons that the National Security Act in 1947 created a Central Intelligence Agency and a Director of Central Intelligence, who at one and the same time is chief officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board, and Foreign Intelligence Adviser to the President and National Security Council. Through the series of NSC Intelligence Directives the President has sought to make the gathering and dissemination of intelligence more rapid and efficient. These Directives put emphasis on the centralization of authority and responsibility in the intelligence field, on making the separate intelligence organizations of the armed services and other departments and agencies contributory to, and not independent of, such central authority, while still allowing them to meet their specialized needs. The President has shown a constant awareness of the urgency of perfecting the national intelligence effort. He gave close attention to the reports on this effort made by the committee under General James A. Doolittle (October 1954) and by the Hoover Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities under General Mark Clark (May 1955). In February 1956 he formally established a President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, first chaired by Dr. James R. Killian and now by General John E. Hull. He gave this Board the continuing mission of reviewing the conduct of our foreign intelligence activities and reporting thereon periodically to the Chief Executive. The operation of the many intelligence arms in the critical field of intelligence gathering and dissemination at all levels involves a truly vast annual expenditure. But in terms of national survival, the prompt delivery of correct intelligence to the President, the ultimate decision-maker, is an undebatable necessity. Beyond this requirement for current factual intelligence there is an additional requirement for intelligence estimates. These estimates may be addressed to a particular country, area, situation, armament, or function and set forth both the pertinent facts and the likely future actions predicable thereon, or they may seek to arrange logically and with precision the broadest spectrum of intelligence materials into a considered appraisal of what over-all developments may be in future time. Both types of intelligence estimates can be of the greatest possible help to policy-makers and planners. Their preparation requires expert competence and their coordination calls for objective thinking by those who have the authority to agree or differ on behalf of their organizations. Because of the prophetic nature of any estimate, it is of great consequence that the final text should seek not compromise but clarity. Many of the coordinated national intelligence estimates with which I worked during these four years clearly and fully set forth dissenting views held by competent members of the U.S. Intelligence Board. 

Intelligence Orientation for the Makers of High Policy 

The prompt circulation of daily bulletins and special and national estimates as basic orientation for those who make the recommendations and decisions on high policy is an obvious necessity. The Planning Board, responsible for doing the spade-work in forming policy, needs to review the special and national estimates in detail, dissecting them and arguing over them until they become familiar material. And Security Council members need to get them in time to study and weigh them before the subjects to which they relate are taken up at the Council level. Both Planning Board and Council members should be inseminated with their contents, as I once told one of the chiefs of British Intelligence. In the Planning Board this insemination has been a feature of its standard operating procedure since 1953, as I will illustrate in a moment. At the Council level the education of the members is carried on in several ways. In the NSC. The Council members receive daily, weekly, special, and general intelligence publications, and their function requires that they be familiar with this material. In 1953, moreover, in order to insure that Council members are kept fully acquainted with current intelligence, an innovation was introduced at their meetings. Until then, the oral briefing on current intelligence was given each day in the President's office to him alone. Now it became a part of the Council's established procedure to make the first agenda item at each meeting a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence. This oral briefing, assisted by the visual presentation of maps and charts on easels behind the Director's seat, reviews the latest important intelligence throughout the world but focuses on the areas which are to be taken up later in the meeting. It normally consumes from fifteen to twenty-five per cent of the meeting time, being frequently interrupted by specific questions from the President and other Council members. These questions often give rise to colloquies and extemporaneous expressions of views which are of consequence to the policy recommendations that are to be discussed. I have always believed this direct confrontation of the Council each week with current and special intelligence to be an important aid to policy consideration and formulation. Yet the British Cabinet and the War Cabinet under Sir Winston Churchill, to the best of my knowledge, carried on their policy y kn dg eir p y deliberations without the benefit of this stimulating and thoughtfocusing device. There are other ways in which the Council, as the supervisory body to which the Director of Central Intelligence reports, is kept informed about intelligence problems. The Director submits annually to the Council a summation of the problems that have faced the intelligence community in the preceding period and the measures and means adopted for dealing with them. The President and Council must also from time to time review and revise the National Security Council Intelligence Directives, which constitute the charter for the operations of the intelligence community. The revision of one of these detailed and often complicated NSCID's, especially in relation to the functional gathering and rapid dissemination of intelligence, may require months of prior study by a panel of specialists-perhaps scientists, technologists, or communications experts, persons of the highest intellectual and scientific standingbrought together to advise on methods and procedures. Many of the panel studies necessary for the purposes of the experts involve most carefully guarded secrets. Yet it is important that the Council understand, in general terms, how the vast intelligence community of modern days is organized, administered, and operated. The principles which emerge from the findings and recommendations of these highly classified studies are matters for action by the Council, and especially by the President. In times of particular crisis the function of intelligence is conspicuous in its importance. In such historical crises as Indo-China in 1954, the Chinese off-shore islands in 1954 - 1955, and Lebanon in 1958 - to cite a few at random - the intelligence appraisal of the Director of Central Intelligence, the foreign policy appraisal by the Secretary of State, and the military appraisal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were indispensable ingredients in the deliberations held before the die was cast and the policy set by the President. In the Planning Board. The Planning Board necessarily probes deeply into the latest intelligence on each subject that comes before it. A CIA Deputy Director is in regular attendance at the Board table, bringing to its deliberations an informed knowledge of the contents of special and general intelligence estimates. He participates from his point of view in the debate on current matters, and it would be as unthinkable to overlook his views as to overlook those of the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is seated at the table as adviser on military issues. The CIA Deputy Director and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs seek to coordinate the preparation of intelligence estimates with the forward agenda of the Planning Board. To that end the agenda is tentatively scheduled for a period of two months or more ahead so that the flow of intelligence materials can be arranged to meet the policy-makers' demands. Of course, history sometimes takes a hand, and the scheduled forward agenda has to be suspended for the immediate consideration of a special estimate that has been urgently called for. There can be nothing static or cut-and-dried in scheduling ahead the Planning Board's work-load (and consequently the Council's forward agenda) ; it is entirely unpredictable how long a time may be consumed in the preparation of particular policy recommendations or what interruptions may be forced by extrinsic happenings. Whatever the order of business, however, one factor is essential: a foundation of the latest and best intelligence to build upon and a constant rechecking of intelligence material as time marches on to the Council deliberation and the Presidential decision. In the OCB. Turning for a moment from policy formulation to the coordination of plans for carrying out approved policy, we find that in this work of the Operations Coordinating Board current intelligence is again a necessary ingredient. At the weekly meetings of the OCB over which the Under Secretary of State presides, there are in regular attendance senior representatives of Defense, Treasury, Budget, USIA, AEC, and ICA, and the two cognizant Special Assistants to the President. At the informal Wednesday luncheon which always precedes the OCB meeting the Director of Central Intelligence has an opportunity to thrash out problems of a sensitive nature. At the more formal Board meetings which follow he is a full participant. T'ne coordination of planning in the responsible departments and agencies for the execution of a policy which the President has approved requires the same up-to-theminute intelligence that the making of the policy did. The Annual Policy Review. The annual Estimate of the World Situation produced by USIB member agencies is awaited each year with the greatest interest--and anxiety-by those in the policy-making apparatus. It is an invaluable production, presenting as it does a distillation of the painstaking efforts of the entire intelligence community to state as of the year-end the dimensions of the foreign threat to our national security. It is written with scrupulous care, it is well documented, and it sets forth with clear distinction, where differences of opinion occur, the opposing views of the experts who cannot agree with the majority estimate. I conceive this annual basic estimate to be of great consequence-as a stimulant, as a guide, as a frank expression of differing views on matters which may be of highest significance. It is this estimate which constitutes each spring the point of departure for the recurring review of our basic national security policy. The first step in this review is to schedule the Estimate of the World Situation for discussion at two or three meetings of the NSC Planning Board. At these meetings it is subjected to 7 to 10 hours of controversial discussion in a search for better understanding. Its contents are analyzed and dissected so that attention can be focussed upon its most important conclusions. In some years distinguished consultants from "outside of government," such men as General Gruenther, John J. McCloy, Arthur W. Burns, Karl R. Bendetsen, and Robert R. Bowie, have been invited to these Planning Board meetings. They have been asked, after study and review of the high points in the Estimate, to discuss them with the Planning Board at a meeting of several hours' duration. Then these points, together with the consultants' and the Planning Board's reaction to them, have been brought before the National Security Council at several meetings wholly devoted to their consideration. Short papers presenting the policy issues and their implications are prepared by the Planning Board as a basis for Council discussion at these meetings. The purpose of the procedure just described is not, of course, to try at the Planning Board or Council level to change or modify any part of the annual Estimate. The purpose is to sharpen understanding of the important aspects of the Estimate and to study and discuss in open meeting the policy implications thereof. Through this procedure the Council members become sharply aware of the high points in the Estimate and the differences in view regarding them, and can join in a give-and-take discussion without feeling bound by the more formal presentation of carefully prepared policy recommendations. Almost as important as the ultimate policy decision itself is the intellectual controversy which precedes it, the educative and consolidating effect of full and frank discussion, the exposure of views which have not become fully formed in departmental exercise, the emergence of novel and interesting ideas at the highest level. The way in which this product of the intelligence community serves as a regular precursor to the Planning Board's annual review of basic policy is a cogent illustration of the community's essential role in the shaping of national security decisions. 

A Model Case

 It may be appropriate, at the close, to describe what in my view is the ideal procedure for formulating a national security policy. Let us take as an example not the annual broad policy review which may consume several months, but a national policy on the State of Ruritania. First, the Ruritania item is scheduled far ahead on the Planning Board agenda, with three to five or more sessions devoted to it. At the first of these sessions the Board will have before it a national intelligence estimate on Ruritania. It will also have before it a factual and analytical statement, prepared by the responsible department or departments or by an interdepartmental committee, on the military, economic, political, and other germane aspects of the Ruritania policy problem. To this compilation of factual data and analysis, whether supplied in separate memoranda or as a staff study, have contributed the vast resources of the informed departments and agencies of government, the brains and experience of the operating personnel who work day after day in the particular area of Ruritania and have learned at first hand the strengths and limitations involved, the very persons who staff the departments and agencies that will be called upon to implement this policy they are working on when and if it receives Presidential approval. The intelligence estimate and the departmental material are explained, discussed, and chewed over in one or more meetings of the Planning Board. A senior representative of a responsible department is likely asked to attend at the Board table and be questioned and crossquestioned about the factual information and tentative policy recommendations submitted by his department. The Board seeks to squeeze out of the material all the juice that it contains. After these proceedings, a draft policy statement is prepared by the responsible department or by an interdepartmental or special committee. This draft will consist of a set of "general considerations" (drawn from the intelligence estimate and the factual and analytical material as a basis for policy recommendations), a statement of the "general objectives" of the proposed U.S. policy toward Ruritania, a more detailed proposal for "policy guidance" in the several areas of U.S. - Ruritania relations, and appendices covering anticipated financial costs of the proposed policy and comparison of military and economic expenditures and other data for past and future years. At as many Planning Board meetings as required this draft statement is discussed, torn apart, revised. In the intervals between the meetings revised texts are drafted by the Planning Board assistants for consideration at the next meeting. Finally, from this arduous intellectual process emerges either full agreement on the correctness of the facts, the validity of the recommendations, and the clarity and accuracy of the text, or-as is often the case-sharp differences of opinion on certain major statements or recommendations. In the latter case, the draft policy statement will clearly and succinctly set forth, perhaps in parallel columns, these opposing views. When the draft policy has been thus shaped, reshaped, corrected, revised, and finally stated, it is circulated to the Council at least ten days before the meeting which is to take up policy on Ruritania. Council members will thus have sufficient time to be briefed on the subject and familiarize themselves with the contents of the draft, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have time to express in writing and circulate to Council members their formal military views on the exact text which the Council is to consider. That is my concept of how the integrating procedure of the NSC mechanism should work when it is working at its best. Some such procedure is the desired goal, a goal often approximated in actual performance. The views of all who have a legitimate interest in the subject are heard, digested, and combined, or in the case of disagreement stated separately. In a good many instances the views of experts or knowledgeable people from "outside of government" are sought and worked into the fabric at the Planning Board level. The intelligence estimates, the military views, the political views, the economic views, the fiscal views, views on the psychological impact - all are canvassed and integrated before the President is asked to hear the case argued and comes to his decision.< It is certainly true that human beings are fallible and that the instruments which they create are always susceptible of improvement. The mechanism which I have described, and its operation, can and will be improved as time goes on. But the main course of this integrative process seems to me mechanically and operatively sound. And it must be grounded on the firm base of the best and latest intelligence. 1 In 1951, in the early organizational stages of the Psychological Strategy Board, the author served as its Deputy Director and representative at meetings of the NBC Senior Staff, later to become the Planning Board. In early 1953 President Eisenhower asked him to study the organization and functioning of the NBC mechanism and make recommendations to strengthen and vitalize its structure and operating procedures. He then became the President's principal assistant with reference to the operations of the Council. He was moved from the position of Administrative Assistant (January-March 1953) to that of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, where he served from March 1953 to April 1955 and from January 1957 to July 1958. 2 The NSC Planning Board, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, is composed of officials of the departments and agencies which are represented at the Council table with reference to a policy matter there under consideration. These officials have a rank equivalent to Assistant Secretary or higher. Each is supported by a departmental or agency staff. Each has direct access to his department or agency chief and commands all the resources of his department or agency for the performance of his duties. 3 The NSC Operations Coordinating Board, of which the President's Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination is Vice Chairman, is composed of officials of the departments and agencies concerned with the policies referred to the Board by the President for assistance in the coordination of planning. These officials have a rank equivalent to Under Secretary or higher. Each is supported by a small departmental or agency staff. Each has direct access to his department or agency chief and commands all the resources of his department or agency for the performance of his duties.

Thursday, 29 September 2022

Elimination of political adversaries and others threats

 


Investigación de inteligencia sobre la eliminación prioritaria de adversarios políticos usando métodos de contrainteligencia estratégicos y tácticos.

Como parte de esta investigación, simularemos una situación que requiera la asignacion de esta operación a un equipo GARD de Intelligences Inc.
 
Político de nombre código Aoo1 solicita la contratación del servicio GARD, para la eliminacion prioritaria de Político nombre codigo L002, su principal adversario, El caso esta sujeto a la autorizacion de  carta Dark, que significa: sin reglas.

El equipo GARD evalúa la oferta y toma el caso para su inmediata ejecucion. 
Todos las operaciones GARD se manejan de confidencial. 

Operación Nombre clave: DIPOGi


El primer contacto con la operación: Recopilación de inteligencia.

1.0 Recopilar información del partido político enemigo

La recopilación de Inteligencia sobre el partido político enemigo como las estragias que utilizaron en el pasado, las fuentes de exposición, sus miembros actuales y antiguos mas relevantes es fundamental para evaluar la situación desde el panorama interno o externo y identificar aliados potenciales, desdientes, desidentes potenciales u otras debilidades. 

1.1 Elegibles
Las personas elegibles pasan a ser desidentes-aliados potenciales. Se asigna oficiales de vigilancia para monitorear sus movimientos, llamadas, redes sociales, personas con la que habla y dejado de hablar., todo lo que haga.

1.2 La reunión de primer contacto

Reunión accidental ocasionada y manipulada 1
Trabajar con los oficiales de monitoreo para simular un encuentro accidental en un lugar publico como un bar, gymnacio o spa, y establecer un itento de comversacion sobre algo en comun.  la información 

Reunión accidental ocasionada y manipulada 2
Puede llevarve a cabo en el mismo lugar del 1 contacto. El agente es establer confianza hablando sobre su familia y sus tardes de picnic. El agente no debe hacer preguntas personales, puede esperar el sujeto mencione sus temas de forma natural. Normalmte 

Reunion acordado
Se establece una hora y lugar para hablar temas 
 

1.3 Penetración interna del partido

Despues de identificar desidentes o desidentes potenciales se asigna oficiales de vigilancia para monitorear sus sus movimientos 
La penetracion puede ser un proceso complicado y debe ejecutarse con extrema precausion, debido al alto riesgo de exponer las fentes aliadas externas. Cualquier error de palabras en el proceso del trato puede conllevar a exponer la operacion y una posible contrainteligencia enemiga.

2.0 Recopilar información del candidato principal 

Recopilar información del candidato, sus familiares, vinculo social o cualquiera que haya estado vinculado a dicho sujeto desde su existencia. 


La informacion interna puede utilizarse para debilitarlo moralmente y la informacion externa para desacreditarlo eticamente en los medios de Television y redes socialesLa información puede incluir actividades o antecedentes, biográficos, legales, penales, médicos, educativos o financieros, así como cobertura mediática anterior o el historial de votación de un político.  La investigación de la oposición también puede implicar el uso de "rastreadores" para seguir a un individuo y registrar sus actividades o discursos políticos. [1]

La investigación generalmente se lleva a cabo en el período de tiempo entre el anuncio de la intención de postularse y la elección real; sin embargo, los partidos políticos mantienen bases de datos a largo plazo que pueden cubrir varias décadas. La práctica es tanto una maniobra táctica como una medida de ahorro. [2] El término se usa con frecuencia para referirse no solo a la recopilación de información, sino también a cómo se utiliza, como un componente de la campaña negativa .

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